US and Iranian officials appear fixated nuclear deal on the costs of JCPOA re-entry, but they’ll pay a far higher price if they fail to get an agreement.
Despite assertions by all parties that the negotiators are “very close” to sealing the deal, the seemingly never-ending nuclear talks with Iran have hit yet another stumbling block.
The main point of contention is Iran’s demand that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps be taken off the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, or FTO.
Although such a delisting would have few practical consequences, it has brought to the fore President Biden’s key challenge with a renewed nuclear deal: Is the political cost of securing the deal higher than the cost of letting it die?
To be clear, the delisting is little more than symbolic to both sides. As Esfandyar Batmanghelidj points out, the FTO designation is only one out of many ways that the IRGC is both sanctioned and classified as a terrorist organization.
Even if Biden removes the IRGC from the FTO list, it will remain a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, a decision first taken by Washington in 2007.
Nor will foreign companies feel comfortable engaging with companies associated with the IRGC. The Iranians will not benefit practically from the delisting, nor will the United States suffer any tangible loss.
Politically, however, both Tehran and Washington have unnecessarily painted themselves into a corner.
At the Doha Forum in Qatar last weekend, Iran’s former foreign minister Kamal Kharazi and current adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, insisted that the IRGC “certainly must be removed” from the FTO list for nuclear talks to succeed. Walking back such categorical statements will be costly.
Similarly, the issue has given ammunition to JCPOA opponents in the U.S. Senate, where it needs the support of at least 41 Senators in order to ensure that a resolution of disapproval of the agreement fails.