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Sajjad Jahanfar, Another Kurdish Author and Scholar, Arrested

 

A local source told the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran that Sajjad Jahanfar, a young author and researcher from Gilan-e-Gharb, was arrested on 12 August in Kermanshah. Jahanfar has authored several books, such as the seven-volume book, “Stories of The Medea Land,” in Persian and the Kurdish language.

Sajjad Jahanfar’s arrest took place when security forces showed up to the homes of several literary and cultural activists in Gilan-e-Gharb in the Kermanshah Province during the past two weeks, arresting at least three people.

The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran earlier announced the names of three arrested individuals, Jamal Khani, Farhad Vakilinia, and Naeem Najafi, who are members of the Banan Literary Society in Gilan-e-Gharb, and contributors to the cultural website Tagh-e-Vossan.

It is not yet clear on what charges the individuals have been arrested and none of them have so far been allowed to contact or see their families.

 

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Siavash Eslami’s Lashing Sentence Carried Out

 

HRANA News Agency – Siavash Eslami, a board member of Teachers Union in Sari, received 37 lashes according to a verdict handed down by the Appeals Court.

According to a report by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), Siavash Eslami is a union activist who has been charged with acting against national security through participating in the events after 2009 presidential elections. He was initially sentenced to 74 lashes, but the Appeals Court later reduced this verdict to 37 lashes.

Siavash Eslami was flagged on Sunday, July 31, 2011, one day before the month of Ramadan began. It has been reported that Siavash Eslami was fasting when taken to Sari Enforcement Bureau to be flogged.

Siavash Eslami has been a teacher for 24 years and holds a master’s degree in political science. He has been teaching Islamic Studies in various high schools in Sari, the capital of Mazandaran Province.

 

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Political Prisoner Mashallah Haeri Hospitalized

 

HRANA News Agency – On Thursday, August 4, 2011, political prisoner Mashallah Haeri who has been locked up in Rajai-Shahr Prison, Ward 4, was hospitalized due to deteriorating health.

According to a report by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), Mashallah Haeri is one of the political prisoners from 1980’s. He suffers from heart and respiratory problems. Mashallah Haeri, 58, has had two heart attacks thus far and can’t bear prison conditions.

Judge Moghiseh presiding over the Revolutionary Court, Branch 28, sentenced Mashallah Haeri to 15 years in prison and also exiled him to serve this term at Rajai-Shahr Prison.

 

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Iran: Public Letter to Supreme Leader about Torture in Prison Brings Abdollah Momeni New Trial Instead of Justice

 

In an interview with the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Fatemeh Adinehvand, wife of student activist and political prisoner Abdollah Momeni, expressed surprise for his new summons to court. “The last time I visited Abdollah on Monday, 25 July, he told me that he had been summoned to court the previous week because of his letter to the Supreme Leader, and that his charges include ‘propagating lies’ and ‘creating public anxiety.’”

A year after he wrote a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader in which he spoke of the torture he suffered during his interrogations, asking him to investigate the performance of prison and security authorities, Momeni was summoned on Tuesday, 19 July to Branch 4 of Evin Prison Court, facing serious charges for this letter.

“Abdollah was so upset. He said that ‘I was asking for justice, now they have answered me this way. Instead of addressing my letter, they have taken me back to court.’ I was also very surprised when I heard this from Abdollah, wondering why instead of investigating this injustice, they have taken my husband to court, accusing him. Regrettably, not only his request for justice was not addressed, but they fabricated a new case against him, calling him a liar in court,” said Adinehvand.

Speaking about Momeni’s physical health in prison, Adinehvand said: “It’s prison life afterall, with its own specific problems. Mr. Momeni has an earache now and the prison infirmary doctor has told him that he has a ruptured eardrum, and he must seek treatment outside the prison. This must have happened during his interrogations under torture. For the past two years, he has developed a skin condition in prison which he has been unable to treat. He also once went to the prison infirmary for a heart problem which has not been treated.”

Momeni’s in-person visits have also been reduced since his letter to the Supreme Leader. “Since March 2010, my children and I have only been able to have in-person visits with Mr. Momeni twice. Our last visit in-person visit was last March,” added Adinehvand.

Abdollah Momeni, a former spokesperson for the Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdatstudent organization, was arrested following the 2009 election. He was later sentenced to four years and 11 months in prison. Currently he is in Ward 350 of Evin Prison.

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No News of Political Prisoner Farshid Abdollahi After One Year

 

HRANA News Agency – Although one year has passed since Farshid Abdollahi was detained, there has been absolutely no news of him during this time. His current condition and whereabouts remain unknown. Farshid Abdollahi was one of the students expelled from the Azad University of Tehran, Imam Hussein Complex.

According to a report by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), on August 10, 2010, Farshid Abdollahi was arrested in Imam Khomeini Airport when he attempted to enter Iran from the United Arab Emirates. Farshid Abdollahi’s family didn’t know that he was arrested for the first four months of his incarceration. Six months after his arrest, Farshid Abdollahi was permitted to contact his family for the first time. In another phone conversation, Farshid Abdollahi complained about his condition and the place where he was being held.

Thus far, Iranian officials have refused to give clear answers about Farshid Abdollahi’s condition or whereabouts.

In 2005, Farshid Abdollahi was expelled from the Azad University of Tehran because of his political activities. After his dismissal, He subsequently moved to Dubai and lived there for a few years.

 

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Innocent Voices Speak Out: the impact of harassment and imprisonment of children of human rights act

 

Amnesty Int’l UK blog – Innocent Voices Speak OutThe impact of harassment and prison on the children of human rights campaignersSaba Vasefi

Asieh Amini, journalist and human rights activist once said: ”Our children aren’t civil activists or political activists. Nevertheless they experience double the suffering. They first suffer when their parents’ activism makes them aware of the hostility and violence and cruelty that exist in society. Then they suffer from the political violence imposed on their parents by the state”.

“Mehraveh is 11. She reacts badly upon seeing a woman in a chador (the long, black cover for women in Iran). She says she hates them. Her little brother Nima is scared of the police. He says: “The police will punish you. They stop the car, they make children get out of the car and they put them into a cage,” says Reza Khandan the father of Mehraveh and the 3 year old Nima, and husband of Nasrin Sotoudeh, the prominent and courageous human rights lawyer who is currently serving long-term prison for her humanitarian work. Little Nima has met his mother, Nasrin, for only 35 minutes over the last 6 months.

The wife of the political activist, Ahamd Zeid Abadi told the author what happened when her 8 year old son saw the security guards take his father away: “When the anonymous government officers were forcing my husband into the car, my son was shouting from the balcony, “You idiots! You are stupid! Where are you taking my dad?”

Fatemeh AdinehVand, wife of political activist Abdollohah Momeni, said, “It has been 9 months since my children have seen their father. They have become quick tempered. When we visited the Evin Prison, they were pale and frightened.”Apart from the violence and the abuse that children of political activist suffer, UNICEF reported in 2003 that 31% of Iranian children under the age of five had been victims of punishment in their own home at least once.The Agency that protects women and children confirmed that in Iran 144,566 cases of child abuse were reported, over the first 6 months of 2010. The Children’s Protection and Children’s Rights Society in Iran confirmed that from the 9 million children under the age of 6, and 27 million under the age of 18, 200 cases of child abuse have been reported. This number includes; 20% physical abuse and 32% emotional abuse. 90% of these abuses have been committed by father, mother, and step father or step mother in a private space or family home.Despite the increasing number of cases of violence committed by the state which are reported to human rights organizations, there has been no official record of violence against civil or political activists over the last two years. Iranian law in practice has no consideration for the mental health of activist’s children. Their parents cannot complain about the effects of their punishment on the children because they already are accused by the law and imprisoned. The children cannot meet with their arrested parents and experience violence from the officers in their personal home environment whenever they come to take the parent away. The violence against children includes preventing the children from meeting their parents, children being intimidated by the guards and children meeting with their parents in the hostile prison environment. However, there is no official report about the increase in child abuse in Iran. In an interview with News Online, Mosa Ghorbanee, a member of the law committee in the Iranian Islamic Parliament asserted about children and youth rights: “Iran is one of the most advanced members of the Children Rights Convention and the current regulations in Iran are clear in the debate on child abuse because of the existence of Islamic punishment in child abuse, this subject has no place in the family support bill that is before parliament.” A feeling of security is developed when a child’s subconscious is being formed. When security is considered not achievable, a child with a victim mentality often internalizes the problem in an attempt to survive. They may become more isolated, violent or not build avenues for communication.  A child’s conflict with society, which may accompany them all through their life, is not curable by using medication. So far no medication has been discovered for generating a sense of security.  Feeling insecure has a direct impact on learning ability. An anxious mind is not able to process new information. This can result in a learning disability and curtailment of a child’s social and emotional growth. The signs, when a child’s sense of security and mental health is being endangered, include: pessimism, isolation, irresponsibility, anger, eating disorders, loss of bladder and bowel control, falling school marks, finger sucking, nail chewing, skin scrubbing, restlessness and an inability to communicate or concentrate.

“Even after 31 years the smell of smoke makes me anxious and depressed. My grandmother held my hand and took me to the backyard to burn all my father’s books, before the arrival of the secret police. My father was running to escape over the neighbour’s roof. Some secret police entered our house a few hours later. I didn’t see my father for more than 3 years after that. I was only nine years old.” “An extract from Behrang’s memoirs”.“Rose water fragrance makes me anxious. My father was executed and my mother was imprisoned for many years. Rose water fragrance reminds me of the meeting days of my parents in the prison prior to their execution. After 30 years, I haven’t yet forgotten the smell of the rose water on the uniform of the prison guard (Pasdar),” said Bahareh. Iranian government has not yet made any attempts to include a treaty of children’s rights in its constitution. It has not established watchdog committee and guarantees to screen the implementation of Convention Children‘s Rights and by accepting conational children’s rights convention It has neglected international standards in creating a suitable life for children by taking the following actions: accepting a conditional children’s rights convention, then it has added various note to the original convention’s substance, rendering a different definition of “child”, discrimination against children, violence against children, right of life, living with parents, right of entering or exiting the country, learning rights etc. Therefore it, Iranian government has disrupted international standard aimed at creating a good life for children.These violations by Iran occur where, under the articles 19 and 24 of the Children’s Rights Convention, which Iran has joined but added it is own conditions. Governments have an obligation to provide security and a healthy emotional and physical environment for children. Children have the right to live without fear and violence regardless of religion, gender, race or ethnicity. Committing violence by ministry of Intelligence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Sepah pasdaran) against the human rights activists’ children and other children is the violation of children’s  rights as stipulated in Convention which Iran is a signatory and must adhere to. It is important that human rights organisation especially the United Nations Human Rights Council make the Iranian government accountable to the violation of the Convention alongside other human rights violation that they commit routingly.

Saba Vasefi is a researcher and a human rights activist. Among other work, she has made a documentary about child execution in Iran which  was shown at the UN in Geneva and at the Copenhagen film festival (DOX). She also made a multimedia documentary about the execution of “Shirin Alamhooli” who was a Kurdish political female activist. This work was also shown at the UN in Geneva.

 

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Jailed journalist given furlough after two years

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Ahmad Zeidabadi, a jailed journalist and secretary general of the student organization, Advar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, has been allowed his first temporary leave since he was arrested two years ago.

Zeidabadi was an aide to Mehdi Karroubi, the reformist presidential candidate and opposition leader, who is now under house arrest for rallying protesters.

Zeidabadi was arrested after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election led to widespread protests across Iran. He was sentenced to six years in prison and exile to Gonabad as well as a lifetime ban from social and political activity.

Zeidabadi won the UNESCO World Press Freedom Prize in 2011 and, in a statement that was read in the ceremony, he wrote: “I have never crossed the laws and regulations of the Iranian government in my work, but they have violated their own laws and regulations by inflicting such pains on me that have been beyond my endurance. Pains that are comparable to weeks of crucifixion or being buried alive.”

Zeidabdi also won the 2010 Golden Pen of Freedom award.

He is among nine ailing Iranian journalists in Islamic Republic prisons whose plight has been taken up by Amnesty International. The group recently called on authorities to provide the prisoners with immediate medical care.

 

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Three activists arrested

 

Three activists have been arrested by the security forces and transferred to the Intelligence Ministry Detention Center in Kermanshah.

Poet Jamal Khani, teacher Farhad Vakilinia and student Naeim Najafi  were active in Kurdish cultural and literal fields.

The reason for the arrests is unclear.

The above picture belongs to Naeim Najafi.

 

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Labor Activist Ali Nejati Sentenced to One Year in Prison

 

HRANA News Agency – The Ahvaz Appeals Court, Branch 13, has sentenced Ali Nejati to one year in prison. Ali Nejati is one of the board members of Haft Tapeh Sugarcane Company Workers’ Trade Union.

According to a report by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), this verdict is handed down despite the fact that Ali Nejati has already served six months in the Fajr Prison of Dezful for the same charge. While he was in prison, Ali Nejati was summoned to court to be tried again on charges for which he was behind bars.

According to a report by the website of the Coordinating Committee to Create Labor Organizations, after Ali Nejati’s prison term was over, prosecutors attempted to try him again, but the charges were dismissed by the court since they were repetitive.

After the acquittal, because of the prosecutor’s objection and pressure from intelligence officials, Ali Nejati’s case was once again referred to the appeals court at the provincial capital.

About three years ago, Ali Nejati was fired from his job at Haft Tapeh Sugarcane Company after working there for over 25 years. Consequently, he has also been suffering financially and has lost the means to support himself. Ali Nejati suffers from heart problems and the clogging of arteries. After his most recent heart surgery, he has been receiving medical care for several months.

 

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The Revolutionary Guards

 

Alireza Nader
  • The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is Iran’s most powerful security and military organization, responsible for the protection and survival of the regime.
  • The Guards are also currently Iran’s most powerful economic actor, reinforcing their influence over political decisions.
  • Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have formed a symbiotic relationship that buttresses the supreme leader’s authority and preserves the status quo.
  • U.S. and international sanctions against Iran may be strengthening the Guards at the expense of more pragmatic elements.
Overview

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was created after the 1979 revolution to enforce Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s concept of an Islamic state ruled by a velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). The Guards played a crucial role not only in crushing early opposition to Khomeini’s vision, but also in repelling Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980. Since then, the Guards have functioned as both the primary internal and external security force. The IRGC has now eclipsed the Artesh, or conventional forces. It operates substantial and independent land, sea and air forces. It commands burgeoning missile forces. It runs asymmetric warfare through the elite Qods Force and proxy groups, such as Hezbollah. And it would most likely command a nuclear arsenal, if the regime chooses to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
Over time, the Guards have also been transformed into a leading economic and political actor. The IRGC and its associated companies are involved in many sectors of Iran’s economy, allowing it to amass unprecedented power. The Guards’ ascendance could not have happened without the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Khamenei relied on the Guards to buttress his declining authority and to block political reform. As guarantor of the revolution’s core principles, the IRGC played a key role in marginalizing reformist and pragmatic conservative factions seen to challenge those principles.
Military and security role

The IRGC has played an important role in suppressing groups that opposed Khomeini’s objectives, such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Organization. The MEK, a leftist group founded in the 1960s, backed the revolution but then split from the theocrats; it was the largest Iranian opposition group until the 2009 election spawned the Green Movement. The Guards were also responsible for putting down various leftist and ethnic insurgencies that broke out after the revolution.
Iraq’s 1980 invasion of Iran actually proved to be a boon for Khomeini and the Guards, as it helped unite the nation around the new regime and bolstered the Guards as Iran’s premier military force. The Artesh was the shah’s main prop; they were also trained and supplied by the Unites States, so were viewed with suspicion by the regime. The Guards, loyal to velayat-e faqih, took the lead in repelling Iraq, although their involvement may have actually prolonged the conflict because of their ideological commitment and lack of military experience. Nevertheless, the Guards’ role in Iran’s so-called “holy defense” against Iraq has been used over the years to burnish their credentials as defender of the revolution and the nation.
The Guards forces now number up to 150,000 men divided into land, sea and air forces. The IRGC land forces are estimated to number between 100,000 and 125,000. The IRGC’s navy may total as many as 20,000, though some estimates are significantly lower. Another 20,000 are in the IRGC naval forces. And the Qods Force totals around 5,000. The Basij militia, which is subordinate to the Guards, can also mobilize hundreds of thousands of its members to defend Iran against a foreign invasion.
The Guards are also in charge of executing Iran’s strategy of asymmetric warfare in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack. The IRGC’s secretive Qods Force has trained and equipped proxy groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite insurgents, and even elements of the Taliban. Some surrogates have already been used to target U.S. and other Western forces in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan; they could be used against U.S. targets outside Iran in the event of a future conflict.
The Guards have also developed an asymmetric naval strategy for use against the U.S. Navy, which has a superior conventional force. The Guards have hundreds of fast attack boats, anti-ship cruise missiles, and naval mines. Together they impede U.S. operations in the Gulf, disrupt shipping, and impose a painful cost on U.S. forces in the event of an armed conflict. The Guards also operate hundreds of ballistic missiles that can target U.S. forces stationed in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, in addition to Israel and beyond.
The Guards are also Iran’s most powerful internal security force, at times cooperating and competing with the ministry of intelligence and other security organizations. The Guards’ intelligence organization appears to have eclipsed the ministry of intelligence in scope and authority, especially after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Other security organizations such as the Basij and the Law Enforcement Forces have become subordinate to the Guards.
Economic giant

The Guards’ involvement in the Iranian economy began during Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency. Reconstruction of Iran’s economy, battered by nearly 10 years of war and revolution, was one of his major priorities. The IRGC had the manpower to engage in reconstruction activities. Rafsanjani may have also hoped to co-opt the Guards by giving them a slice of the economic pie.
Over the next 20 years, however, the Guards became Iran’s largest economic force. The Guards currently dominate most sectors of the economy, from energy to construction, telecommunication to auto making, and even banking and finance. Khatam al Anabia (the Seal of the Prophets), the Guards’ construction headquarters, is involved in much of the Guards’ official economic activities. But the IRGC is also linked to dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of companies that appear to be private in nature but are run by IRGC veterans. So the Guards’ economic influence activities encompass a broad network of current and former members rather than a single official or centrally administered organization.
The IRGC has taken advantage of its national security authority to extend its control. The Guards prevented a Turkish company from building the Imam Khomeini international airport in 2004 on national security grounds. The takeover of the Telecommunications Company of Iran by a Guards-affiliated consortium in 2009 may have also been motivated by security concerns, especially after the presidential election and subsequent unrest.
The Guards have arguably benefitted from international sanctions and Iran’s isolation, which hurt their domestic and foreign business competitors by increasing business costs. The IRGC’s ability to tap into state funds and its relatively vast independent resources have provided a decisive advantage. Under Ahmadinejad, the Guards have been awarded hundreds of no-bid government contracts in addition to billions of dollars in loans for construction, infrastructure and energy projects. The Guards reported involvement in illicit economic activities may also cushion them from the full effects of sanctions. Ironically, tougher sanctions would undoubtedly further damage Iran’s economy, but they may actually strengthen the very force driving national security policies, including the nuclear program.
Political role

One of the key issues dividing reformist and conservative factions has been the role of the Guards in Iranian politics. Reformists and even some conservatives contend that Khomeini explicitly forbid the Guards’ involvement in politics. The Guards, they argue, were established only to protect the regime. The Guards’ political ascent began during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami between 1997 and 2005. Khatami and his supporters envisioned a series of political, social, and economic reforms to make the Islamic Republic a more “modern” Islamic system. But the reformist agenda threatened the conservative ideology, political power and ideological authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini in 1989. Reformist intellectuals questioned Khamenei’s leadership, and even the efficacy of having a supreme leader. Khamenei viewed the Guards as an effective bulwark against the reformist agenda.
The Guards’ rank and file has historically reflected Iranian society and politics at large. Many Guards members supported Khatami in 1995 and Mir Hussein Mousavi in 2009. Nevertheless, the Guards’ top leadership is comprised of conservatives and “principlists” deeply opposed to political reforms. The IRGC leadership’s opposition to Khatami’s reforms was manifested in the “chain murder” of reform intellectuals. The Guards also wrote a letter to Khatami threatening a coup d’etat if he did not rein in the 1999 student demonstrations.
The 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard and a “principlist,” could not have been possible without the active support of Khamenei and the Guards. Allegations of fraud and ballot-stuffing by the Guards and Basij surrounded Ahmadinejad’s victory over Rafsanjani. After the election, Ahmadinejad awarded the IRGC even more government loans and contracts. Guard members also won increasing control of Iran’s internal and national security organizations. IRGC ideologues loyal to Ahmadinejad and the political status quo were also appointed to replace reformists, pragmatic conservatives and technocrats in the bureaucracy.
The 2009 presidential election confirmed the Guards’ role as Iran’s preeminent power broker, after the supreme leader. Senior Guards officials indicated they would not tolerate a reformist such as former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s leading opponent. Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli, a former Guards officer turned businessman who was responsible for supervising the election, played a crucial role in Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And after the disputed poll, the Guards were in charge of crushing the mass protests that flared for six months. The reformist and Green Movement accused the Guards of conducting a coup.
But the Guards are not a united or monolithic force. And not all IRGC members are ideologues. Many respect Mousavi, who was prime minister in the 1980s, for his devotion to the revolution and his conduct during the Iran-Iraq War. Some Guards have also reportedly been disappointed with Ahmadinejad—and even Khamenei—because of the post-election suppression of dissent. Nevertheless, the symbiotic relationship between Khamenei and the top echelon of the Guards is likely to ensure the IRGC’s role as enforcer of the status quo and the principles of the revolution.
The future
  • The Guards’ and so-called principlists’ domination of the regime after the 2009 election may result in more belligerent Iranian foreign and domestic policies, especially on the nuclear issue.
  • The Guards may be able to maintain the political status quo if they remain a unified force. However, they face internal divisions, which could potentially weaken Khamenei’s hand in a moment of crisis.
  • The Guards’ involvement in the business world may erode its credibility to the extent that it will not be able to function as an effective security or military force in the future.

 

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