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Rezaei releases secret Iran, Iraq war letters

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Sun Jun 7, 2009 6:14AM
As Iran’s political scene heats up before the elections, presidential hopeful Mohsen Rezaei promises to release a series of confidential Iran-Iraq war letters.
“I plan to publish the letters gradually after the elections,” Rezaei told reporters while on the campaign trail in the western Iranian city of Yasouj.The more than 500 letters contain the confidential correspondence between the late leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Rulhollah Khomeini, and Rezaei, who then was the chief command of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC).

Fighting alongside the Iranian military, the IRGC was a key force that helped Iran push back enemy forces during a devastating eight-year war waged by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hossein.

The letters exchanged between Rezaei and Ayatollah Khomeini could shed light on how Iranian forces managed to prevent Saddam from realizing his territorial ambitions, despite the massive political, military and financial support that he received from his Western and regional Arab allies.

Having retired from military service in 1998, Rezaei is now one of the four candidates running in Iran’s tenth presidential elections.

Asked whether a decision to release the letters prior to the June 12 vote could influence the outcome in his favor, Rezaei said that he did not believe in using wartime secrets as a campaign tool.

MJ/JG/DT

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U.S. designation of the IRGC

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http://www.sanctioniranregime.eu/fact-sheets/u-s-designation-of-the-irgc/

Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism
U.S. Department of Treasury
Washington, D.C.
October 25, 2007

The U.S. Government is taking several major actions today to counter Iran’s bid for nuclear capabilities and support for terrorism by exposing Iranian banks, companies and individuals that have been involved in these dangerous activities and by cutting them off from the U.S. financial system.

Today, the Department of State designated under Executive Order 13382 two key Iranian entities of proliferation concern: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Additionally, the Department of the Treasury designated for proliferation activities under E.O. 13382 nine IRGC-affiliated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals as derivatives of the IRGC, Iran’s state-owned Banks Melli and Mellat, and three individuals affiliated with Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).

The Treasury Department also designated the IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) under E.O. 13224 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations, and Iran’s state-owned Bank Saderat as a terrorist financier.

Elements of the IRGC and MODAFL were listed in the Annexes to UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. All UN Member States are required to freeze the assets of entities and individuals listed in the Annexes of those resolutions, as well as assets of entities owned or controlled by them, and to prevent funds or economic resources from being made available to them.

The Financial Action Task Force, the world’s premier standard-setting body for countering terrorist financing and money laundering, recently highlighted the threat posed by Iran to the international financial system. FATF called on its members to advise institutions dealing with Iran to seriously weigh the risks resulting from Iran’s failure to comply with international standards. Last week, the Treasury Department issued a warning to U.S. banks setting forth the risks posed by Iran. (For the text of the Treasury Department statement see: http://www.fincen.gov/guidance_fi_increasing_mlt_iranian.pdf.) Today’s actions are consistent with this warning, and provide additional information to help financial institutions protect themselves from deceptive financial practices by Iranian entities and individuals engaged in or supporting proliferation and terrorism.

Effect of Today’s Actions

As a result of our actions today, all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person will be prohibited and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen. Noting the UN Security Council’s grave concern over Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, the United States also encourages all jurisdictions to take similar actions to ensure full and effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747.

Today’s designations also notify the international private sector of the dangers of doing business with three of Iran’s largest banks, as well as the many IRGC- affiliated companies that pervade several basic Iranian industries.

Proliferation Finance – Executive Order 13382 Designations

E.O. 13382, signed by the President on June 29, 2005, is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Designations under the Order prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) is composed of five branches (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Quds Force special operations) in addition to a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic interests involving defense production, construction, and the oil industry. Several of the IRGC’s leaders have been sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1747.

The IRGC has been outspoken about its willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD. The IRGC’s ballistic missile inventory includes missiles, which could be modified to deliver WMD. The IRGC is one of the primary regime organizations tied to developing and testing the Shahab-3. The IRGC attempted, as recently as 2006, to procure sophisticated and costly equipment that could be used to support Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs.

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL): The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) controls the Defense Industries Organization, an Iranian entity identified in the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 on March 30, 2007. MODAFL also was sanctioned, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, in November 2000 for its involvement in missile technology proliferation activities.

MODAFL has ultimate authority over Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which was designated under E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005. The AIO is the Iranian organization responsible for ballistic missile research, development and production activities and organizations, including the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which were both listed under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated under E.O. 13382. The head of MODAFL has publicly indicated Iran’s willingness to continue to work on ballistic missiles. Defense Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said that one of MODAFL’s major projects is the manufacturing of Shahab-3 missiles and that it will not be halted. MODAFL representatives have acted as facilitators for Iranian assistance to an E.O. 13382- designated entity and, over the past two years, have brokered a number of transactions involving materials and technologies with ballistic missile applications.

Bank Melli, its branches, and subsidiaries: Bank Melli is Iran’s largest bank. Bank Melli provides banking services to entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including entities listed by the U.N. for their involvement in those programs. This includes handling transactions in recent months for Bank Sepah, Defense Industries Organization, and Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group. Following the designation of Bank Sepah under UNSCR 1747, Bank Melli took precautions not to identify Sepah in transactions. Through its role as a financial conduit, Bank Melli has facilitated numerous purchases of sensitive materials for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. In doing so, Bank Melli has provided a range of financial services on behalf of Iran’s nuclear and missile industries, including opening letters of credit and maintaining accounts.

Bank Melli also provides banking services to the IRGC and the Quds Force. Entities owned or controlled by the IRGC or the Quds Force use Bank Melli for a variety of financial services. From 2002 to 2006, Bank Melli was used to send at least $100 million to the Quds Force. When handling financial transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Bank Melli has employed deceptive banking practices to obscure its involvement from the international banking system. For example, Bank Melli has requested that its name be removed from financial transactions.

Bank Mellat, its branches, and subsidiaries: Bank Mellat provides banking services in support of Iran’s nuclear entities, namely the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and Novin Energy Company. Both AEOI and Novin Energy have been designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 and by the UN Security Council under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. Bank Mellat services and maintains AEOI accounts, mainly through AEOI’s financial conduit, Novin Energy. Bank Mellat has facilitated the movement of millions of dollars for Iran’s nuclear program since at least 2003. Transfers from Bank Mellat to Iranian nuclear-related companies have occurred as recently as this year.

IRGC-owned or -controlled companies: Treasury is designating the companies listed below under E.O. 13382 on the basis of their relationship to the IRGC. These entities are owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders. The IRGC has significant political and economic power in Iran, with ties to companies controlling billions of dollars in business and construction and a growing presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors. Through its companies, the IRGC is involved in a diverse array of activities, including petroleum production and major construction projects across the country. In 2006, Khatam al-Anbiya secured deals worth at least $7 billion in the oil, gas, and transportation sectors, among others.

  • Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters
  • Oriental Oil Kish
  • Ghorb Nooh
  • Sahel Consultant Engineering
  • Ghorb-e Karbala
  • Sepasad Engineering Co
  • Omran Sahel
  • Hara Company
  • Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem

IRGC Individuals: Treasury is designating the individuals below under E.O 13382 on the basis of their relationship to the IRGC. One of the five is listed on the Annex of UNSCR 1737 and the other four are listed on the Annex of UNSCR 1747 as key IRGC individuals.

  • General Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC
  • Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie, Deputy Commander of the IRGC
  • Vice Admiral Ali Akhbar Ahmadian, Most recently former Chief of the IRGC Joint Staff
  • Brigadier Gen. Mohammad Hejazi, Most recently former Commander of Bassij resistance force
  • Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani, Commander of the Quds Force

Other Individuals involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programs: E.O. 13382 derivative proliferation designation by Treasury of each of the individuals listed below for their relationship to the Aerospace Industries Organization, an entity previously designated under E.O. 13382. Each individual is listed on the Annex of UNSCR 1737 for being involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program.

  • Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the Aerospace Industry Organization (AIO)
  • Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept., AIO
  • Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Department, AIO

Support for Terrorism — Executive Order 13224 Designations

E.O. 13224 is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of terrorists and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Designations under the E.O. prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF): The Quds Force, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), provides material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).

The Quds Force is the Iranian regime’s primary instrument for providing lethal support to the Taliban. The Quds Force provides weapons and financial support to the Taliban to support anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition activity in Afghanistan. Since at least 2006, Iran has arranged frequent shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and probably man-portable defense systems to the Taliban. This support contravenes Chapter VII UN Security Council obligations. UN Security Council resolution 1267 established sanctions against the Taliban and UN Security Council resolutions 1333 and 1735 imposed arms embargoes against the Taliban. Through Quds Force material support to the Taliban, we believe Iran is seeking to inflict casualties on U.S. and NATO forces.

The Quds Force has had a long history of supporting Hizballah’s military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support. The Quds Force operates training camps for Hizballah in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and has reportedly trained more than 3,000 Hizballah fighters at IRGC training facilities in Iran. The Quds Force provides roughly $100 to $200 million in funding a year to Hizballah and has assisted Hizballah in rearming in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

In addition, the Quds Force provides lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shi’a militants who target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and innocent Iraqi civilians.

Bank Saderat, its branches, and subsidiaries: Bank Saderat, which has approximately 3200 branch offices, has been used by the Government of Iran to channel funds to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah and EU-designated terrorist groups Hamas, PFLP-GC, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. For example, from 2001 to 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through its subsidiary in London to its branch in Beirut for the benefit of Hizballah fronts in Lebanon that support acts of violence. Hizballah has used Bank Saderat to send money to other terrorist organizations, including millions of dollars on occasion, to support the activities of Hamas. As of early 2005, Hamas had substantial assets deposited in Bank Saderat, and, in the past year, Bank Saderat has transferred several million dollars to Hamas.

Revolutionary Guards Have Financial Interest in Keeping Iran Isolated

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http://www.cfr.org/publication/13466/sadjadpour.html

Interviewee:
Karim Sadjadpour, associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Interviewer:
Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

May 29, 2007

Karim SadjadpourKarim Sadjadpour, an Iranian-American who worked for several years in Iran with the International Crisis Group, says he increasingly believes elements within Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have an economic motivation in keeping Iran relatively isolated in the world, and in encouraging the latest domestic crackdowns. “Whenever there is the prospect of a U.S.-Iran dialogue or improved Iranian relations with the West, hardliners do their very best to torpedo such efforts,” he says.

There have been several developments in Iran that have aroused considerable concern in the United States, particularly in academic circles. One is the arrest of a prominent American-Iranian scholar, Haleh Esfandiari, who has been a leader in encouraging Iranian-American academic exchanges, and who was in Iran to visit her mother. She’s been accused, as have the others, of plotting to bring about a “velvet revolution” in Iran, and of working for Israel and the United States. Her arrest has led to the condemnation of Iran from all sorts of people. What’s causing this latest crackdown on people who are interested in better relations in Iran?

Well, I don’t know if we can say there’s one precise reason behind the crackdown. I think it certainly was in the realm of possibility that the government in Tehran is trying to send a very stern signal to the Bush administration to cease any democracy promotion effort in Iran. At the same time, the government in Tehran is trying to send a very clear signal to Iranian-Americans and all those who work on issues of civil society or internal politics in Iran that they should tread very carefully. But I’m also increasingly coming to the conclusion that there’s a small but very powerful clique within Iran, among the political elite, who actually have entrenched political and financial interests in retaining Iran’s isolation. And whenever there is the prospect of a U.S.-Iran dialogue or improved Iranian relations with the West, they do their very best to torpedo such efforts.

You say they have a “financial interest” as well. Could you elaborate?

You have hardline elements within the Revolutionary Guard, who right now have enormous financial assets, and they maintain a kind of a private mafia. And the last thing they want is Iran to open up to the rest of the world, to join the WTO. I think their logic is that right now Iran is a closed society, and the less open the merrier.

“Whenever there is the prospect of a U.S.-Iran dialogue or improved Iranian relations with the West, hardliners do their very best to torpedo such efforts.”

Explain a little bit about the Revolutionary Guards. Is this a very large organization?

The Revolutionary Guards comprise about 150,000 in number. They’re not a monolithic group. There’s a common perception right now that the Revolutionary Guards are very closely aligned with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But I would say it’s the opposite. President Ahmadinejad has to pander to the Revolutionary Guards to project his own power, because he doesn’t have a very strong popular base. And it’s difficult to describe them as a group of 150,000 hardliners because in 2001 three-quarters of them voted for the liberal Mohammed Khatami’s re-election as president. In some ways, the Revolutionary Guards are more reflective of the Iranian society than we think. They also want change and reform to take place. But again, when I talked about this powerful clique with entrenched political and financial interest, I don’t think that they’re large in number. I think they represent a minority, a small minority of Iran’s political elite. But they do an outstanding job of consistently playing the spoiler.

And are they involved in the ministry of intelligence which has been responsible for the arrests?

I would say about those who want to retain Iran’s isolationist status—it is not just for financial interests, but it also fits their political worldview. They’re very xenophobic, and many of them still adhere to the old adage from Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution in 1978-79, that the relationship between the United States and Iran is like that between a wolf and a sheep. They’re extremely mistrustful of U.S. intentions and they don’t believe that having a more open Iran is in their own political interests.

“It’s difficult to describe the[Revolutionary Guards] as a group of 150,000 hardliners because in 2001 three-quarters of them voted for the liberal Mohammed Khatami’s re-election as president. In some ways, the Revolutionary Guards are more reflective of the Iranian society than we think.”

Do some of these Revolutionary Guards own businesses? Are they in the oil business?

Yes, they’re getting billion dollar contracts right now, and they essentially operate as contractors. They don’t have the technical know-how whether it’s in the oil industry, or in major infrastructure projects, but they get non-competitive bids, and then they outsource the project. They also have a lot of jetties, or “free-trade ports” where the average Iranian businessman who wants to import or export items is subject to heavy tariffs. The Revolutionary Guards, in turn, operate their own free-trade port, so they’re not subject to tariffs.

I didn’t realize that. And how do the Revolutionary Guards relate to the Iranian army. Revolutionary Guards suggests sort of a militant group. You’re indicating they’re not just a military outfit.

At the onset of the Revolution, there was a lot of concern that the Shah’s army couldn’t be counted on to be loyal to the newly established Islamic republic. So the Khomeinists started the Revolutionary Guards to be the protectors of the revolution. That was the original idea for their existence. But over time they’ve grown in number and they’ve grown in stature, and now there’s a lot of concern that as their economic interests have grown over the years, so have their political ambitions.

Let’s move on to another subject. There’s been a crackdown in Iran, not only on those interested in the United States and the West, but on women’s rights groups. Can you elaborate?

I think Iranian women are among the most progressive women in the Middle East. They’re very capable. We have Shrin Ebadi, the Nobel Prize winner. We have great artists, painters, and doctors and professionals. I would say that despite, not because of the Islamic Republic, Iranian women have still managed to assert themselves in a very important way in Iranian society. And I think their defiance is fairly subtle and fairly apolitical, meaning they’re not so much marching in the streets protesting, but it’s just daily acts of defiance. They are increasingly entering the workforce and going to university. Sixty percent of the universities are women, many not adhering to the strict dress code that was imposed upon them in the early days of the revolution. I would say that those who are political and out marching in the streets for women’s rights are not large in number as a percentage of the population, but they’re not negligible either. And the fact that the regime is choosing to crack down on them, shows that it is  concerned about this women’s rights movement.

Talk about the university students. Now if I read the political reporting correctly, there was a major effort by young intellectuals or reformers to boycott the last presidential election in 2005. Do they now regret this? There seems to be a lot of opposition to President Ahmadinejad among the university students these days.

At the time, their rationale for not wanting to participate in the elections was this: “We went out to the polls en masse in 1997 to overwhelmingly elect Mohammed Khatami, but he wasn’t able to effect change the way we wanted him to. So over the course of the next five years, we elected a very reform-minded parliament, and when that wasn’t able to deliver change, we even went and reelected Khatami in 2001. We renewed his mandate and we turned out in Scandinavian turnout levels, 70-80 percent of the population voting, and we gave Khatami mandates of maybe 80 percent.”

But after some eight years of not being able to effect changes via the ballot box, I think it’s very natural that many people decided that voting in Iran is an exercise in futility. As one secular intellectual once put it to me, “It’s like going to the gym every day for six years and not losing one pound. Pretty soon you’re going to stop exercising.” I think the rationale for not participating in the election was at the time sound, but I think now, in retrospect, those people who used to say, “Why should we vote, it doesn’t make any difference,” now realize that actually voting does make a difference, because you can go from kind of an unpleasant situation to a very negative situation. And you can go from someone like Khatami to someone like Ahmadinejad.

Now is there an election coming up for the Majlis, the parliament, in February 2008. Could there be a groundswell of opposition to the president in this election?

“President Ahmadinejad’s mandate when he was elected was extremely clear… I never encountered one person who said ‘I voted for Ahmadinejad because he’s going to take a hard-line nuclear posture or he’s going to take a hard-line against Israel.’  His mandate was extremely clear, and that was to improve people’s economic lot.”

President Ahmadinejad’s mandate when he was elected was extremely clear. I covered those elections very closely, and I never encountered one person who said “I voted for Ahmadinejad because he’s going to take a hard-line nuclear posture or he’s going to take a hard-line against Israel.”  His mandate was extremely clear, and that was to improve people’s economic lot. Now the way he’s been comporting himself both domestically and internationally has led to capital flight and to diminished foreign investment. And he’s created a very unfriendly economic atmosphere, and he hasn’t delivered on his lofty economic promises. So I think it would be logical that in the parliamentary elections, those who are aligned with President Ahmadinejad probably won’t do that well, because they haven’t delivered on any of their promises.

What is the economy like in Iran now?

Well, I think the economy in a country like Iran which is so rich in natural resources and so rich in human capital is really underperforming. You had a baby boom when the revolution occurred in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged people to go out and have many children in order to produce this robust Islamic society. Now these children of the revolution are entering the labor market, but they’re not finding jobs. So you not only have unemployment, but you have a lot of underemployment. Young men and women who are educated are not finding jobs, and having to work at jobs for which they’re overqualified. They are driving taxis; architects are selling pizza. And there is heavy inflation. And any time you have a populist president like Ahmadinejad whose solution to problems is simply to inject cash into the economy, it’s natural that it leads to rising inflation.

U.S. policy toward Iran seems to have two aspects. One is this rather modest program, the equivalent of the Cold War cultural program funding broadcasts and money to help out in exchanges. And the other is this cover activity that keeps going on. A lot of the commentators have sort of blamed the U.S. for the arrests in Iran. What do you say about that?

Well, I don’t think we can blame the United States for the cruelty of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic has been behaving in cruel fashion since 1979. For example, the punishment of stoning women to death for adultery existed before the neocons came to power in Washington. But that being said, I think the perception in Tehran, especially the perception of Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, is that the U.S. problems with Iran are not about Iran’s external behavior, but about the very character of the Iranian government. Khamenei believes deep down that Iran’s patch of real estate bordering the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, a strategic location with natural resources, is so important that he believes that the United States really wants to go back to a relationship with Iran which they had in the time of the Shah. This was essentially a patron-client relationship. So when the U.S. appropriated $75 million for civil society and democracy promotion in Iran, this simply reinforced the world view of those in Tehran who believe that the United States is out to change the character of the Iranian government.

And of course, the major foreign policy confrontation continues to be the nuclear enrichment program that Iranians continuing in the face of two series of sanctions in the Security Council, and probably another set will be coming up shortly if the Chinese and Russians agree. Is there any discomfort in the leadership over this sort of international isolation they’re getting themselves into?

There are plenty of people like Ali Larijani, the nuclear negotiator, who doesn’t appreciate Ahmadinejad’s approach.  I think they appreciate the need for Iran to retain good ties, for example, with the Europeans and not solely rely on Chinese and Russian support. But I think right now the leadership in Iran is banking on the fact that China and Russia won’t sign up to any substantial sanctions. And without China and Russia on board, European resolve is going to waver. The regime believes that if Iran continues to be persistent, this entire coalition is going to unravel. So I think they’re banking on the fact that if they hold strong, eventually, they’re going to be able to win out. At the same time, many Iranians feel, especially those like Ayatollah Khamenei, that they’re still in a difficult position because they think that if they compromise as a result of the pressure, it’s not going to get them out of trouble, but it’s going to invite even more pressure, it’s going to validate this hard-line approach against them. Someone like Ayatollah Khamenei doesn’t want confrontation—and certainly doesn’t want to have military confrontation—but he’s also averse to accommodation.

I would think he’s making a mistake. I would think any sign of a compromise by Iran would be very welcome in the West.

Well, again, we go back to his worldview. He really believes that it’s not about Iran’s external behavior, that it’s about the character of the Iranian government, which the United States has a problem with, and I think he believes that if he compromises as a result of the pressure, it’s not going to strengthen the argument of those in the State Department who argue for a conciliatory approach to Iran. It’s going to strengthen the argument of people like [Vice President] Dick Cheney who say, “See, the pressure’s working, let’s turn up the heat even more.”

I would think the next presidential election in the United States would be very important for Iran. I don’t see any sign of any of the Democratic candidates wanting to have a softer view on Iran, do you?

I think if you’re a U.S. politician, you don’t win any points by saying, let’s engage Iran, especially when you have a president in Iran who has called for wiping Israel off the map and questioned that the Holocaust happened. I think in the context of domestic U.S. politics it doesn’t win you any points by saying, let’s engage with Ahmadinejad.

Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.

US Defense Secretary Expresses Concern About Iranian Involvement in Iraq

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http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-02-15-voa66.html

15 February 2007

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says he is concerned to find Iranians involved in some of the explosives aimed at coalition troops in Iraq. But he added that he does not know whether the Iranian government is behind it. VOA’s Stephanie Ho reports from Washington.

Defense Secretary Gates told reporters at the Pentagon Thursday there is evidence of Iranian involvement in sophisticated explosive devices that have been used against coalition troops in Iraq. Specifically, he pointed to the Quds force, which is the elite brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.

“We know that the Quds force is involved. We know that the Quds force is a paramilitary arm of the IRGC. So, we assume that the leadership of the IRGC knows about this,” he said.

At the same time, he stressed that he does not know whether the highest levels of Iranian government are giving the orders.

“Whether or not more senior political leaders in Iran know about it, we don’t know. And frankly, for me, either way it’s a worry. Either they do know, and have approved it, or they don’t know and the IRGC may be acting on their own, in Iraq,” he said.

Gates said the number of explosives with Iranian involvement actually make up a small percentage of the so-called improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, that coalition troops in Iraq encounter. But he said the United States is looking at a bigger picture.

“So, our focus is more broadly on disrupting these IED networks throughout Iraq. The Iranian responsibility for one set of them is a concern. We are taking action to try and deal with that, but it’s part of a much larger problem,” he said.

In response to a reporter’s question about whether the Pentagon is worried that the public is skeptical about U.S. intelligence claims, Gates said he has only presented information that is “factual” and “able to be substantiated with evidence.”

“These are hard facts based on the technologies and the actual weapons themselves. I think that that evidence speaks for itself and I hope that the people will see the evidence in that respect. We are not looking for an excuse to go to war with Iran. We are not planning a war with Iran,” he said.

These comments follow a recent briefing by U.S. military officers in Iraq, who spoke on condition of anonymity, and are reported to have claimed that senior Iranian officials are directly involved in providing powerful bombs to Iraqi insurgents.

Arab Syria an Iranian Province

The statement issued by Iranian scholar Mehdi Taeb, a prominent political figure in charge of overseeing the soft war that has been launched by Iran, did not contain anything new, nor did its issuance come out of the blue. However this statement could be viewed as the most informative and clear of all such statements in this regard. Taeb’s assertion that Syria is nothing more than the 35th province of Iran and that its fall is more dangerous to Tehran than the fall of Ahvaz offers new evidence of Iran’s increasing influence in Arab states, particularly Syria. In addition to this, the statement also contains important information regarding the organic and even structural and administrative relations between Tehran and Damascus.

The statement is based on a number of considerations, most prominently Iran’s assent towards conquering and occupying Syria and causing the Syrian state to disappear, to the point that the country now resembles Kuwait following Baghdad’s 1990 invasion when it became Iraq’s 19th province. If the Iraqi invasion was carried out by wide-scale military force then Iran’s conquest of Syria occurred through the firm use of soft power. Ultimately, both scenarios resulted in the same outcome. The Kuwaiti people were not sympathetic towards the occupation of their country and they strongly confronted this, while the Syrian will certainly oppose the Iranian invasion and oppose it even more fiercely. Therefore Iran’s blatant intervention in the Syrian crisis and its opposition to the Syrian people’s desire for change cannot be described as defending a regime of “resistance”, but rather defending Iranian sovereignty as represented by its 35th province, or in other words, defending Iran itself.

Iran has pursued this policy through the use of excessive military power; directly via the deployment of over sixty thousand fighters to Syria and indirectly by providing the Damascus regime with all means of support. We must therefore acknowledge the magnitude of the challenge that the Syrian insurgents are facing on the ground, which is fierce, and goes far beyond confronting an autocratic regime. Those who are fighting on the ground in Syria are actually fighting two armies: the regime’s army, as well as the Iranian army of occupation which is made up of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Force, not to mention the Lebanese and Iraqi militias, among others. As a result of this, the suffering of the Arab people in Syria will be prolonged and political change will be delayed. As for the objective of the conflict, this is no longer the toppling of an autocratic regime; rather this has now become the liberation of an occupied state. This is something that has served only to double the legitimacy of the Syrian insurgents who have taken up arms.

No matter how strong, firm, and robust relations between the Iranian and Syrian regimes are, this must not lead to the forfeiture of Syria’s national identity or the country being added to a list of Iranian provinces. The fact that the Alawites are still in control of the situation and regime in Syria was not enough to prompt Iran to abstain from its plans and deal with Syria as a state with a similar sectarian and political identity in a fair and equal manner. This was also insufficient to prompt Iran to dismiss its expansionist agenda, or at least feign doing so in order to avoid embarrassing Damascus. Iran will not do this for one simple reason, namely that it is a nationalist and expansionist state par excellence. Iran is a state that exploits and uses religion and sectarian ideology to further expand its influence, regardless of the ideological nature of the targeted state, whether Shi’a, Sunni or otherwise.

The Arabs, who have been mesmerized by the Iranian propaganda, must reconsider their attitudes towards Tehran, which is the master of eliciting sentiment and portraying itself as the guardian of Shi’ism. However in reality, Iran’s real objectives go far beyond this and include stripping states of their sovereignty and changing their national identity.

Transforming Arab Syria into a mere Iranian province also represents a threat to Arab national security, in addition to a destabilization of regional stability and security. In either case, this must be handled in an extremely serious manner. We must not be content with mere condemnation, denunciation or suspension of Syria’s Arab League membership, although this is required in order to prevent the infiltration of the Arab League after Syria has become an agent of Iran and a fifth column, as acknowledged by Iran itself. Rather, our response must be reflected on the ground in order to change the nature of the ongoing struggle in Syria.

The Arabs have lost their deterrent and their strongholds are under threat from within, while their interests abroad are also in jeopardy. However a true awakening is on the way and the signs of this are clear to see. Although such statements serve to provoke and harm our dignity, they are ultimately desirable for they serve as a wake-up call to all those who have been negligent in this regard, and there are too many to mention.

So expect another shameless statement in the future from one of the pillars of velayat-e faqih(Guardianship of the Jurist) in Iraq, and we can only expect this statement to be shocking by any and all standards. The issuance of such a statement is a foregone conclusion particularly as Iraq is closer to Iran than Iran is to Syria. Iraq is a Gulf state with a larger land mass and more natural wealth than Syria, while its location on the Iranian political map make it even more important.

Source: InsideofIran

Pictures show construction on sensitive Iranian military site

Exclusive: New satellite pictures confirm that Iran has continued to expand a sensitive military site where Tehran is accused of conducting experiments relevant to developing a nuclear weapon.

For the last eight years, international inspectors have been excluded from the Parchin military complex, where Iran is believed to have tested rockets and explosives. In particular, Iran is accused of using Parchin to experiment with detonators inside an “explosives containment vessel”.

Any such tests would be “strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development,” according to the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Inspectors have not been allowed into Parchin since February 2005. But satellite images obtained by the Daily Telegraph show that construction of new facilities has continued inside the complex.

One picture, taken last October, shows a cluster of three new buildings near the entrance to a tunnel. “This area has the appearance of a research and test facility,” said an analysis from McKenzie Intelligence Services, a consultancy.

”One of the buildings appears to be for the purpose of an activity that requires venting, possibly a test facility or laboratory. The other large building appears to be a control building to monitor activity in the first building,” it said.

The largest building has been constructed in a relatively isolated location, cut into a hillside. “This suggests an activity takes place within which may be volatile enough to warrant protection to the surrounding area should anything go wrong,” added the analysis.

The pictures confirm the IAEA’s report earlier this month that Iran has pressed on with construction inside Parchin. Some of the efforts appear to have been designed to cover up evidence of previous work.

The IAEA noted that “in the light of the extensive activities that have been – and continue to be – undertaken” at Parchin, even if inspectors were allowed to visit, their “ability to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined”.

Downing Street said Iran should do more to show that its nuclear programme poses no threat. Asked if Britain believed that Iran’s possible production of plutonium at the Arak plant – highlighted by satellite pictures in the Daily Telegraph yesterday – could be wholly civilian and peaceful, the Prime Minister’s spokesman said: “The assurances to that fact have not been forthcoming. That is why we have both a diplomatic process but also the process of the track of economic sanctions.”

Source: Telegraph