type here...
Home Blog Page 580

Qods Force Operation in Africa

crazydead
-
0
Qods Force Operation in Africa

 

In October 2010, Nigerian security forces seized an Iranian weapons shipment in the Lagos port of Apapa.  The arms seizure led to the arrest of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force officer in Nigeria suspected of facilitating the shipment.  The seizure also resulted in a rare exposé of how the Iranian Qods Force, an organization charged with exporting the Islamic Revolution and reporting directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, operates outside of the Middle East.

In October 2010, Nigerian security forces interdicted a shipment of Iranian weapons at the Apapa port in Lagos, Nigeria.  An examination of the details reported since indicates that the shipment may be the first public case in recent years of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force operation conducted outside of the broader Middle East.

At some point in 2010 the MV Everest, a Marshall Islands-registered ship operated by French firm CMA CGM, picked up 13 twenty-foot containers at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.  The Iranian shipper identified the contents of the cargo as “construction materials,” specifically glass wool and stone pallets. The MV Everest made a stop at the Jawaharlal Nehru port in Mumbai, India before arriving in Nigeria’s Apapa port in Lagos between early- and mid-July 2010, according to Nigerian customs agents and court documents. The unloaded cargo remained sealed at Apapa for several months after it arrived there.

On October 12, 2010, the Iranian shipper and its agents attempted to have the cargo moved from Lagos, Nigeria to Banjul, Gambia after failing to obtain release documents. Local authorities initially granted clearance for the shipment to leave the port, but customs and security officials intervened before it could be released. Nigerian State Security Services (SSS) seized and opened the containers on October 26, 2010 to find them filled with 107 mm artillery rockets, 60/81/120 mm mortars, grenades, explosives, and rocket launchers. The Iranian weapons cargo seizure led to a diplomatic row between the Nigerian and Iranian governments, a UN Security Council investigation, and the public revelation of Iranian hard power activity in Africa.

THE OPERATION

Nigerian authorities named two Iranians suspected of involvement in the weapons shipment: senior Qods Force officer Azim Aghajani and the Qods Force commander for operations in Africa Ali Akbar Tabatabaei. Both Aghajani and Tabatabaei were in Nigeria at the time of the seizure.  The two men initially retreated to the Iranian embassy in Abuja to avoid arrest. Iranian embassy officials there eventually provided the Nigerian government access to Aghajani, but claimed diplomatic immunity for Tabatabaei. Iranian officials claimed that Aghajani was an Iranian expatriate representing a private company selling “defensive arms” to a West African country.Nigeria’s Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia made a formal request for access to Tabatabaei; however, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki turned down the request and Tabatabaei fled to Iran in mid-November. On November 25, 2010, Nigerian courts charged Aghajani and three Nigerians for the illegal importation and exportation of weapons.

It is unclear how long the two Iranian operatives were in Nigeria prior to the weapons seizure.  They were both provided with identities that attempted to disguise the nature of their activities.  Aghajani appears to have entered the country with the help of a Nigerian with ties to the Iranian regime. Nigerian government reports indicate that Aghajani received permission to enter Nigeria after Sheikh Ali Abbas Usman, alias Abbas Jega, provided a reference for him. The Nigerian government identified Usman as an “Abuja-based businessman” and charged him, along with two other Nigerians including customs agents, for conspiring with Aghajani. Tabatabaei, on the other hand, entered Nigeria after Iranian foreign ministry officials received permission to station him there to “provide administrative support” to the Iranian embassy.

Additional information on Tabatabaei’s role in the case has not emerged after he fled Nigeria following Mottaki’s arrival in Nigeria.  Recent unconfirmed reports note that Tabatabaei has been reassigned to Venezuela to oversee Qods Force operations in Latin America. Tabatabaei’s role in the Nigeria case and the scope of his activities across Africa remain ambiguous, but the nature of his evacuation and Iranian officials’ refusal to allow him to be interrogated suggest that his role in the operation was worth protecting from exposure.

Aghajani and Tabatabaei identified the sender of the cargo as a company based in Tehran named International Trading and General Construction (ITGC). Officials at CMA CGM, the French firm that owned the transporting vessel, maintain that their employees had received falsified documents about the containers’ contents and that the shipper, ITGC, “supplied, loaded, and sealed” the cargo. It is very likely that once the containers arrived in Bandar Abbas the transport vessel owned by CMA CGM liaised with a local Iranian intermediary, Jahan Darya Shipping Agency (JDSA), to load the containers given that JDSA is listed as the exclusive port agent for CMA CGM in Bandar Abbas.

THE DESTINATION

The final destination of the cargo remains a point of speculation and difficult to determine with certainty.  There are at least three potential scenarios for where the cargo was being sent: to recipients in Gambia, to Iranian proxy groups in Gaza, and to radical militia groups in Nigeria.

The attempt to move the cargo to Gambia led to speculation that Nigeria was only a trans-shipment point and that the intended recipient may have been in Gambia.  This scenario, however, appears less likely for several reasons.  The shipper had identified the end destination as Nigeria and had the cargo unloaded in Nigeria, despite the presence of a CMA CGM shipping agent in Banjul, Gambia that could have directly received the shipment. Nigeria’s foreign minister said the paper trail behind the shipment suggested that the arms were destined for an address in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja. The shipper’s decision to send the weapons to Gambia was made only when the shipper failed to obtain the proper documentation to clear the cargo for release in Nigeria.

Israeli defense officials suggested that the shipment was intended for Islamist militants in the Gaza Strip, home to the Iran-backed terrorist organization Hamas. The scenario is plausible considering that Iranian agents have previously smuggled arms to Gaza through Africa.  In January 2009, Israeli jets attacked and destroyed a 23-truck weapons convoy traveling towards Egypt in the Sudanese desert.  The weapons had been initially smuggled into Africa through Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The Nigeria shipment, detected by Nigerian authorities likely with assistance from intelligence agencies that monitor Iranian shipping in the Middle East, could well have been the first leg of an alternative land route to funnel weapons through Africa into Gaza.

Aghajani initially requested that the weapons be sent to Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, which lies more than 300 miles from Lagos.  This request suggests that a local Nigerian group may have been the intended recipient of the weapons. Nigeria’s northern region is home to a sizeable Muslim population, including a Shi’a minority.  One group in this community, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) led by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, has established ties with the Iranian regime and has served as a base of support for it in Nigeria.  The IMN’s rhetoric and symbolism mirror the sentiments of Iranian regime officials and its activities are ideologically aligned with the Islamic Republic. In a 2010 speech, Zakzaky praised Iran’s revolution and its independence from “imperial powers,” adding that “In Nigeria, the establishment of a similar Islamic Republic is quite possible.” No direct evidence has emerged linking the IMN to the arms shipment.  If the Qods Force intended to deliver weapons to or through Nigeria, however, the IMN, or a similar group, would likely be the intended recipient of the weapons.  This scenario could also involve local Nigerian intermediaries acting as facilitators for the second scenario above, the arming of militants in Gaza.

Further details about the shipment and a definitive destination may emerge as Nigerian courts prepare to try Aghajani and his co-conspirator in the coming months. A UN Security Council investigation may also uncover further details.  The information made available thus far has had an impact on the Iranian regime’s relationship with West African leaders. Iranian officials have invested significant effort in cultivating relationships with West African countries, increasing diplomatic ties and economic cooperation. The presence of Qods Force operations in the region will likely complicate Iran’s soft power strategy and make it difficult for regime officials to convince local leaders that its intentions are transparent and benign in nature.

CONCLUSION

Iran’s Qods Force funds, trains, and arms terrorist groups; conducts intelligence operations; engages in covert diplomatic efforts; and carries out economic activities under the mission of exporting the Islamic Revolution and cultivating proxies. Details about the Qods Force’s leadership and operations in the greater Middle East have become widely available in recent years.  Qods Force support to Shi’a militias following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, has been documented. The U.S. Treasury has identified senior Qods Force officers in Afghanistan and Lebanon for their roles in providing financial and materiel support to local insurgent and terrorist groups.

The organization has been known to maintain military ties in Africa and Latin America, but public knowledge of its activities in these regions has been limited until now. The current case before Nigerian authorities demonstrates the tactics Iranian agents use and the intermediaries they operate through.  It appears that two Iranians believed to be Qods Force officials, one a senior officer and the other a commander for the Qods Force in Africa, infiltrated Nigeria with the aid of both Nigerian nationals linked to the Iranian regime and the cover of Iran’s foreign ministry.  Once there they facilitated the shipment of 13 containers of arms using deceptive shipping practices before being discovered.

The arms shipment—whether destined for local militias or Iranian proxies in Gaza—demonstrates the ongoing efforts of the Qods Force, which was designed to export Iran’s revolution and reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, to export instability well beyond Iran’s borders.

 

Source

ISAF captures Qods Force-linked Taliban leader in Afghan west

crazydead
-
0
ISAF captures Qods Force-linked Taliban leader in Afghan west

 

By BILL ROGGIO

In a raid in western Afghanistan yesterday, Coalition and Afghan troops captured a senior Taliban leader who is associated with Iran’s Qods Force.

The Taliban leader, who was not named, “is definitely associated with Qods Force,” an International Security Assistance Force official told The Long War Journal.

“That is based on his acceptance of large sums of money and his facilitation of attacks against ISAF and Afghan forces,” the ISAF official said.

“It is not certain he is a member of Qods Force,” the official continued.

ISAF and Afghan forces captured the Taliban commander along with several fighters during a raid in the Gulistan district of Farah province, ISAF stated in a press release.

The Taliban leader was described as “the senior Taliban leader for Bakwah district” who “receives large sums of money from foreign fighter insurgent groups,” the ISAF press release continued. ISAF often uses the term ” foreign fighters” to describe al Qaeda and affiliated terror groups from outside Afghanistan.

During recent raids in the Afghan south and west, ISAF and Afghan forces have captured two Taliban commanders and targeted another linked to Iran’s Qods Force. In addition to the capture of the commander yesterday, on Dec. 18, 2010 a Qods Force-linked Taliban leader was captured in the Zhari district of Kandahar. ISAF told The Long War Journal the Taliban leader was a member of Qods Force, but retracted the claim two days later. ISAF would neither confirm nor deny that the Taliban commander was linked to Qods Force in follow-up inquiries.

But senior US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said the Taliban commander detained in Zhari is linked to Qods Force and receives aid in shipping and transporting weapons from Iran to Afghanistan.

During a raid in Nimroz on Jan. 2, Coalition and Afghan forces targeted a Taliban leader who is “involved with the facilitation of suicide bombers into Afghanistan and leads subordinate Taliban insurgents operating in the Gulistan and Bakwa districts of Farah province.” Several US military and intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that the commander was linked to Qods Force, but ISAF would not comment on his status.

Farah province is a hub for al Qaeda’s operations in the Afghan west

A Qods Force-supported Taliban and al Qaeda network is currently operating in the remote western province of Farah, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.

Farah province is a known haven for al Qaeda and allied terror groups, and is a main transit point for foreign fighters and Iranian aid flowing into Afghanistan. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Bakwah, Balu Barak, Farah, Gulistan, and Pusht-e Rod; or five of Farah’s 11 districts.

ISAF and Afghan special operations teams have intensified their activity in the province of Farah since October 2010. There have been seven reported raids in Farah, and one in Nimroz targeting a commander who operates in Farah, since the beginning of October, and 13 raids total since March 2010. In the course of the 13 raids, ISAF has killed three al Qaeda-linked commanders; Mullah Aktar,Sabayer Saheb, and Mullah Janan, and captured three more leaders, all who have not been named. All of these commanders have been linked to Iran’s Ansar Corps.

ISAF has been hesitant to comment on the scope of this network. “Due to operation security concerns we are not able to go into further detail at this time,” an ISAF public affairs official told The Long War Journal at the end of November 2010. In a follow-up inquiry today, ISAF again would not comment.

Background on Iran’s covert support for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan

The Qods Force has tasked the Ansar Corps, a subcommand, with aiding the Taliban and other terror groups in Afghanistan. Based in Mashad in northeastern Iran, the Ansar Corps operates much like the Ramazan Corps, which supports and directs Shia terror groups in Iraq. [See LWJ report, Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq.]

On Aug. 6, 2010, General Hossein Musavi, the commander of the Ansar Corps, was one of two Qods Force commanders added to the US Treasury’s list of specially designated global terrorists, for directly providing support to the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan.

ISAF and Afghan forces have targeted several Taliban commanders with known links to Iran’s Qods Force – Ansar Corps. [See LWJ report, Taliban commander linked to Iran, al Qaeda targeted in western Afghanistan.]

In addition to Taliban fighters entering from Iran, Al Qaeda is known to facilitate travel for its operatives moving into Afghanistan from Mashad. Al Qaeda additionally uses the eastern cities of Tayyebat and Zahedan to move its operatives into Afghanistan. [See LWJ report, Return to Jihad.]

For years, ISAF has stated that the Qods Force has helped Taliban fighters conduct training inside Iran. As recently as May 30, 2010, former ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal said that Iran is training Taliban fighters and providing them with weapons.

“The training that we have seen occurs inside Iran with fighters moving inside Iran,” McChrystal said at a press conference. “The weapons that we have received come from Iran into Afghanistan.”

In March of 2010, General David Petraeus, then the CENTCOM commander and now the ISAF commander, discussed al Qaeda’s presence in Iran in written testimony delivered to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Al Qaeda “continues to use Iran as a key facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al Qaeda’s senior leadership to regional affiliates,” Petraeus explained. “And although Iranian authorities do periodically disrupt this network by detaining select al Qaeda facilitators and operational planners, Tehran’s policy in this regard is often unpredictable.”

Iran has recently released several top al Qaeda leaders from protective custody, including Saif al Adel, al Qaeda’s top military commander and strategist; Sa’ad bin Laden, Osama’s son; and Sulaiman Abu Gaith, a top al Qaeda spokesman. [See LWJ report, Osama bin Laden’s spokesman freed by Iran.]

In March 2010, a Taliban commander admitted that Iran has been training teams of Taliban fighters in small unit tactics. “Our religions and our histories are different, but our target is the same – we both want to kill Americans,” the commander told The Sunday Times, rebutting the common analysis that Shia Iran and Sunni al Qaeda could not cooperate due to ideological differences.

 

Source

Iran Primer: The Basij Resistance Force

crazydead
-
0
Iran Primer: The Basij Resistance Force

 

On November 25, 1979, revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the creation of a “twenty million man army.” Article 151 of the Constitution obliges the government to “provide a program of military training, with all requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The “people’s militia” was established on April 30, 1980. Basij is the name of the force; a basiji is an individual member.

The Basij were initially engaged in assisting the Revolutionary Guards and the Revolutionary Committees (disbanded in the early 1990s) to secure law and order in major population centers. The auxiliary military unit also aided the central government in fighting against Baluchi, Kurdish, and Turkoman separatists in remote regions. But their role shifted after Iraq’s 1980 invasion. As the war took its toll on Iranian forces, the poorly trained Basij were deployed alongside the regular Iranian military. They were often used in “human wave” tactics, in which they were deployed as cannon fodder or minesweepers, against Iraqi forces. Mobilization of the Basij for the war-front peaked in December 1986, when some 100,000 volunteers were on the front. The Basij were often criticized for mobilizing child soldiers for the war effort and using children for “martyrdom” operations.

After the war ended in 1988, the Basij became heavily involved in post-war reconstruction. But their role increasingly shifted back to security as a political reform movement flowered in the late 1990s. The Basij became a policing tool for conservatives to check the push for personal freedoms, particularly among students and women. The Basij were mobilized in 1999 to put down anti-government student protests and to further marginalize the reform movement.

Since the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Basij interventions in politics have become more frequent. The Basij were pivotal in suppressing the anti government protests after the disputed presidential election on June 12, 2009. Various branches of the Basij were mobilized to counter anti-government protests at high schools, universities, factories, and on the street. Yet the Basij also performed poorly, as they were unable to suppress demonstrations through their local branches. The Iranian press reported that neighborhood Basij were not willing to beat up neighbors who protested against the election result by chanting “God is great” from their homes. Some Basij members at high schools and universities also reportedly deserted their assignments after commanders chiefs tried to mobilize them to intimidate, harass or beat up fellow students engaged in sit-ins and demonstrations against the election results. And many Basij members evaporated in the face of angry demonstrators in major population centers. Basij and IRGC commanders reported transporting Basij members from outside towns to counter dissidents as the local Basij members were not ready to act in their own neighborhoods or place of work.

Mission and command

The Basij statute stipulates that the militia’s mission is to “create the necessary capabilities in all individuals believing in the Constitution and the goals of the Islamic Republic to defend the country, the regime of the Islamic Republic, and aid people in cases of disasters and unexpected events.”

After an initial rivalry over who would control them, the Basij were formally incorporated in the organizational structure of the Revolutionary Guards in 1981. There was significant rivalry between the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War, according to the memoirs of then parliamentary speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Over the years, the Basij managed to carve out some independence within the IRGC. But they came under the formal authority of the IRGC commander in 2007 and were incorporated into IRGC ground forces in 2008. The IRGC seems to have succeeded in suppressing the independent aspirations of the Basij.

The Basij organizational structure divides each city in Iran–depending on its size and population–into “resistance areas.” Each resistance area is then divided into resistance zones, each zone into resistance bases, and each base into several groups. The smaller towns and villages have Basij “resistance cells.” Sensitive social housing areas, such as housing for members of the regular army, also appear to have a special Basij presence. The Revolutionary Guards and the regular military are effectively rivals for resources, equipment and power.

Branches

The Basij has several branches. There are three main armed wings:

  • Ashoura and Al-Zahra Brigades are the security and military branch tasked with “defending the neighborhoods in case of emergencies.”
  • Imam Hossein Brigades are composed of Basij war veterans who cooperate closely with the IRGC ground forces.
  • Imam Ali Brigades deal with security threats.

The force also has multiple branches with specialized functions. They include:

  • Basij of the Guilds [Basij-e Asnaf]
  • Labor Basij [Basij-e Karegaran]
  • Basij of the Nomads [Basij-e Ashayer]
  • Public Servants’ Basij [Basij-e Edarii]
  • Pupil’s Basij [Basij-e Danesh-Amouzi]
  • Student Basij [Basij-e Daneshjouyi]

Each specialized branch of the Basij functions as a counterweight to non-governmental organizations and the perceived threat they pose to the state. Basij of the Guilds, for example, is a counterpart to professional organizations. The Labor Basij provides a counterpart to labor organizations, unions and syndicates. And the Student Basij balances independent student organizations.

Membership

Estimates of the total number of Basij vary widely. In 2002, the Iranian press reported that the Basij had between 5 million to 7 million members, although IRGC commander Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi claimed the unit had 10 million members. By 2009, IRGC Human Resource chief Masoud Mousavi claimed to have 11.2 million Basij members–just over one-half the number originally called for by Khomeini. But a 2005 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think-tank, put the number of full-time, uniformed, and active members at 90,000, with another 300,000 reservists and some 1 million that could be mobilized when necessary. Persian language open-source material does not provide any information about what percentage of the force is full time, reservists or paid members of the organization. Members include women as well as men, old as well as young. During the Iran-Iraq War, Basij volunteers were as young as 12 years old, with some of the older members over 60 years old. Most today are believed to be between high school age and the mid-30s. The perks can include university spots, access to government jobs and preferential treatment.

The Basij statute distinguishes between three types of members:

  • Regular members, who are mobilized in wartime and engage in developmental activities in peacetime. Regular members are volunteers and are unpaid, unless they engage in war-time duty.
  • Active Members, who have had extensive ideological and political indoctrination, and who also receive payment for peacetime work.
  • Special Members, who are paid dual members of the Basij and the IRGC and serve as the IRGC ground forces.

The Basij statute says members are selected or recruited under the supervision of “clergy of the neighborhoods and trusted citizens and legal associations of the neighborhoods.” The neighborhood mosques provide background information about each volunteer applicant; the local mosque also functions as the Basij headquarters for the neighborhood. For full-time paid positions, applicants must apply at central offices of the Basij, in provincial headquarters of the Basij.

Budget and business

The Basij’s budget is modest. According to the 2009/2010 national budget, the Basij were allocated only $430 million–or less than $40 per member, on the basis of 11.2 million members. But as a corporation, the Basij reportedly accumulated vast sums through so-called interest-free financial institutions that the Basij and the IRGC established in the mid-1980s and the early 1990s to provide social housing and general welfare to their members. As subsequent governments began privatization of publicly owned enterprises, Basij financial institutions used their funds to purchase the privatized companies.

By 2010, the Basij were allegedly a major investor in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The largest Basij-owned investors in the Tehran Stock Exchange allegedly include Mehr Finance and Credit Institution, and its subsidiary Mehr-e Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment Company. Iranian critics of the Basij accuse them of distorting the market, marginalizing not only the private sector, but also the revolutionary foundations that have been a large part of Iranian economy since the revolution. The Basij and the IRGC are also accused of widespread corruption.

Political role

Presidential contender Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of parliament, accused the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards of helping manipulate the outcome of the 2005 election, when Ahmadinejad defeated former President Rafsanjani. Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi raised similar allegations against the Basij after the disputed June 12, 2009 presidential election.

The Basij’s performance since the June 2009 election has been mixed. It managed to suppress street protests in the provinces with the help of the local police forces, but maintaining order in major urban centers, especially Tehran, was more difficult. And their actions have faced backlash. On June 15, Basij members reportedly shot and killed protesters at Azadi Square who were forcing their way into the local militia station. From June 22 onward, the Basij constituted only a minority of the forces cracking down on protesters. Basij commander Hossein Taeb, a Shiite cleric with the rank of hojatoleslam, claimed that eight Basij had been killed and 300 wounded during the anti-government protests.

The Student Day protests in December 2009 proved equally challenging for the Student Basij, who had mobilized several thousand members but were still unable to suppress dissidents at campuses in Tehran, Shiraz and Tabriz. The Basij were also unable to contain the massive demonstrations three weeks later during Ashoura, the holiest time of the year for Shiite Muslims. Senior military officials admitted that the IRGC had to mobilize militia members from the capital’s outskirts and even from other provinces in order to suppress the unrest.

The regime signaled its displeasure with the Basij’s performance. In October 2009, Taeb was removed as Basij chief. A few days later, the militia was formally integrated into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, with Brig. Gen. Mohammad Naghdi as the new chief. In 2010, the Basij focused significant attention on combating perceived threats to the regime from the Internet. Thousands of members were educated in blogging and filtering of dissident websites, Basij officials acknowledged.

The future

  • Without a solution to Iran’s internal political turmoil, the Basij’s role and powers are almost certain to grow.
  • But because they receive less training than other Iranian security forces, their tactics are often the toughest against dissidents–and in turn generate more public anger that could weaken rather than strengthen the regime long-term.
  • Incorporating the Basij into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces may improve the overall Basij performance in the future, but in the short- and middle-term, the IRGC and not the Basij are likely to remain the main pillar of support for the regime.

 

Source

Iran orders Iraqi Allies to support Syrian Regime financially

crazydead
-
0
Iran orders Iraqi Allies to support Syrian Regime financially

 

Asharq Alawsat – A prominent source in the Iraqi National Alliance [INA], which is in alliance with the State of Law Coalition [SLC] led by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, has disclosed that “Iran pressured its allies in Baghdad into supporting the Syrian authorities with $10 billion” and pointed out that “Al-Maliki yielded to this Iranian demand and actually supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad financially.”

The leading source in the INA told Asharq Al-Awsat by telephone from Baghdad: “Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad Hassan Danaifar conveyed verbal messages from Islamic Revolution Guide Ali Khamenei and Al-Quds Corps Commander General Qassem Suleimani to the INA leaders separately that included the need to support the Syrian president financially with a sum set at $10 billion.” It added that “the demand came in the form of orders which Al-Maliki accepted in his capacity as the leader of the Iraqi Government.”

The source revealed that “some INA members objected to the total sum and not the principle of helping President Al-Assad but the Iranian ambassador informed them that he was not authorized to discuss the issue and his task was to convey the message from high-level Iranian religious and political quarters.” It added that “we in the INA are embarrassed because the Iraqi people are suffering from acute economic crises while we agree to pay $10 billion to rescue the Syrian president from his ordeal because of the international sanctions imposed on him.”

The Iranian five-member committee tasked with following up the Iraqi dossier which is supervised by Guide Khamenei took several measures to use the Iraqi resources to back the Syrian regime. According to the INA source, the “Iranian ambassador created for the INA the suitable formula for backing the Syrian regime by having the funds paid within the context of the economic agreements that were concluded and activated between Baghdad and Damascus at the end of last week.”

Syrian Economy and Trade Minister Muhammad Nidal al-Shaar concluded last week a visit to Iraq during which he met Prime Minister Al-Maliki and also several Iraqi ministers which resulted in the signing of several economic agreements. According to the statement issued by his office, Al-Maliki asserted during his meeting with the Syrian minister “the Iraqi Government’s desire to develop commercial and economic cooperation with Syria in all fields in the interests of the two fraternal peoples.”

On his part, Hashim Hatim, director general of foreign economic relations at the Iraqi Trade Ministry, denied that “Iraq has signed more agreements with Syria at this particular time when it is facing internal troubles.” He said in statements to Asharq Al-Awsat earlier this week that “most of the agreements that were signed now between Iraq and Syria have existed since the 1970’s and all we did was activate some of them and alter others due to the change in Iraqi economic policies from centrally-controlled one as it was under the former regime to the market economy.”

According to the INA source, the “Iraqi Government concluded new agreements and activated old ones with Syria, including three agreements in the health, trade, and investment fields, and paid $10 billion in implementation of a purely Iranian will.”

As to the interaction of Al-Maliki’s crisis with the other blocs allied with him in the INA, the source asserted that “Al-Maliki fears his disagreements with his allies will cause a rift in the alliance and hence will lose his battle to keep his post and therefore sought the help of Tehran to pressure the other Shiite parties into having a dialogue and committing themselves to backing him.” It pointed out that “Suleimani tasked their ambassador in Baghdad to carry out this duty.” The source also disclosed that “Iranian Amb. Danaifar is one of the prominent officers in the Quds Corps and worked in the Iranian Revolution’s guards as official in charge of relations between the guards and the opposition Shiite parties that were based in Iran. I personally met him several times at that time and during the phase of coordination between the Iranian authorities and Iraqi opposition leaders whom Danaifar knew personally, among them Al-Maliki whom he met in Damascus and Tehran. They are bound by close ties.” He pointed out that “this explains Al-Maliki’s eagerness to visit Danaifar in hospital when he had a minor accident before two weeks. There is nothing in protocol which says the prime minister ought to visit the ambassador of a neighboring country as this is the prerogative of the foreign ministry’s relations department.”

The INA leader also revealed that a delegation led by an Al-Dawa Party leader and a prominent Al-Maliki adviser visited Iran recently and said “the delegation returned from Tehran with Iranian proposals for supporting Al-Assad’s regime.”

It is recalled that the Iraqi Government has large sums of money deposited in Syrian banks about which there was no talk during the Syrian commercial delegation’s recent visit to Baghdad. Observers believed these funds would stay there at present to support the Syrian authorities.

On his part, Khalid al-Asadi, the SLC deputy in the House of Representatives, has denied that “Iraq has backed the Syrian regime with $10 billion” adding “this report is baseless.” He told Asharq Al-Awsat by telephone from Baghdad that “Iraq needs money to improve its situation so how can it contribute $10 billion to Syria. Moreover, the Syrian Government does not need any financial aid.” He pointed out that “Iraq is bound to Syria by good ties. It is a neighboring country and the Syrian people are our brothers. We wish they unite and Syria remains strong.”

 

Source

Dispatch of IRGC’s Political Messengers Across the Country

crazydead
-
0
Dispatch of IRGC’s Political Messengers Across the Country

 

Roozonline:  After Basij militia commander Mohammad-Reza Naghdi announced a program to enlighten the public for “electing the best”, senior authorities in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) have dispatched thousands of “political messengers” across the country to influence public opinion and consequently the upcoming elections.

During a ceremony to introduce a representative of the supreme leader in the Ghamar Bani Hashemi IRGC Force (in the Chaharmahal va Bakhtiari province), ayatollah Khamenei’s representative cleric Ali Saeedi said, “Eleven thousand political messengers have been identified across the country of which seven thousand are from the Basij militia force and another five thousand from the IRGC who will be active in strengthening and elevating the moral foundations of the IRGC.”

Saeedi also said that the manifestation of righteousness in the Islamic republic was in none other than ayatollah Khamenei. “Obedience to his orders is required by all people and officials, something that is also very important for the composition of the Majlis,” he proclaimed.

These remarks in involving militia and guardsmen in politics come as Iran draws closer to its next big elections for the parliament early next year and as differences among the leaders of the country have intensified and gone public. These remarks on the role of the IRGC and the Basij are interpreted to be more direct and explicit than ever before.

On July 11 this year, Saeedi had said while people do have the right to vote, any election was not right. “Only when the choice of people matched that of God, would it be right.”

Saeedi is among those clerics who believes in the absolute rule of the supreme cleric and has not been shy to express this publicly. In his earlier remarks on this he had also said that Majlis representatives too had to be of the kind approved by the supreme leader. In fact he had said that only those representatives elected by the people who were approved by the supreme leader would be supported by him. The purpose of these representatives he added was to strengthen the supreme leader. “The hierarchy had to be such that everybody was in line with the supreme leader,” Saeedi had said.

Mohammad-Reza Naghdi’s remarks last week once again identified the role that he expects the Basij to play in the upcoming election. At a meeting of the IRGC members in the province of Golestan, he had said, “The goal of the Basij in the upcoming elections is to enlighten the public in a way that enables them to select the best, without the need of informing them of the criteria.”

The Goals of the Political Messengers

The program to create IRGC political messengers and their dispatch all over the country had been devised in the early 2000s, during the last two years of Mohammad Khatami’s administration and the sixth Majlis by the political bureau and the ground forces of the IRGC.

On May 18, 2005, less than a month before the controversial and disputed presidential elections, Sobh Sadegh weekly, the official organ of the political bureau of the IRGC wrote, “Two decades after the victory of the 1979 revolution a group inside the ruling circles has spoken of a reformist movement with emphasis on the media and students. The serial press utilizes all opponents of the regime, inside and outside the country, to present those defending and supporting the regime to be pro-dictatorship and opposing human rights.” The article wrote that following the victory of Mohammad Khatami in the presidential elections in 1997, the IRGC had to build its own instruments to protect and defend the revolution from within, and therefore a priority emerged to elevate political evaluation skills among its members, families, soldiers and Basijis.” According to the article the conditions that had emerged (i.e., the victory of reformists in elections and their representation at the highest offices of the Islamic republic) necessitated the containment of the “forces of sedition,” “confrontation with the psychological war and a response to ambiguities”, and ultimately “enlighten the public”. The program to create the political messengers was a response to these developments and realities, according to IRGC’s official journal. The political bureau of the IRGC views these messengers to be the “most organized, most powerful and most active human network for information dissemination and political guidance of the forces that support the Iranian revolution inside the IRGC.

 

Source

Banned Student Rejects Charges For Interviewing and Showing the ‘V’ Sign

crazydead
-
0
Banned Student Rejects Charges For Interviewing and Showing the ‘V’ Sign

 

Amir Sheibanizadeh, a Mashad student who was banned from continuing his university education, talked to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran about his trial session, held on Monday, 1 August. “A few days ago, they called me to let me know that the upcoming trial session would be regarding the 14 July 2008 protest case against me, for which I was sentenced to eight years in prison. Though I could see the case folder before the Judge, fortunately this case was not brought up at all, and they only questioned me about my other case, which has to do with my participation in a 14 February gathering,” Sheibanizadeh told the Campaign.

Sheibanizadeh, 23, is a banned student who has been arrested repeatedly in the past few years. He was first arrested during a 14 July 2008 protest in Mashad’s Mellat Park. After spending two weeks in a solitary cell, he was transferred to Vakilabad’s Security Ward and was released later on an $80,000 bail. Regarding the 14 July 2008 case, he was recently sentenced to eight years in prison by Branch 4 of Mashad Revolutionary Court.

“Today [Monday], I was in court with four other people who were also arrested for their participation in the 14 February gathering in Mashad. The others were both students and regular people. My charges were ‘acting against national security through illegal assembly on 14 February,’ and ‘propagating against the regime’ for two reasons: one for talking to JARAS website, and the other that after my arrest I had raised my hands showing the ‘V’ sign. I accepted none of my charges and said that I have not lied and I have not done anything wrong. I participated in a walk in support of the people of Egypt and attending it was my Sharia and human right,” he told the Campaign.

“Mr. Sadafi, the Branch 4 Judge at Mashad’s Revolutionary Court, treated me very respectfully and allowed me to defend myself. Now I don’t know what could happen and what ruling will be issued. Others said that they were satisfied with their trial session, too, having been able to defend themselves,” added Sheibanizadeh.

 

Source

Iranian Academic Charged As ‘Enemy Of God’ Brands Court Illegal

crazydead
-
0
Iranian Academic Charged As ‘Enemy Of God’ Brands Court Illegal

 

A former chancellor of Tehran University charged with waging war against God has told the court hearing his case that it is illegal, RFE/RL’s Radio Farda reports.

Mohammad Maleki, who is accused of undermining Iran’s Islamic system, was summoned to Tehran’s Revolutionary Court over the weekend.

Maleki told Radio Farda on August 3 that at first he refused to appear in court because he considers the sentences the court hands down unlawful. He wrote to Judge Moghiseh of the 28th branch of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court to explain that decision, but Moghiseh rejected his explanation.

“I went to the court [on July 30] at the judge’s insistence…but told him that I did not recognize that court as it was illegal,” Maleki told Radio Farda.

Maleki, 78, is among the oldest activists and intellectuals to have been arrested in the crackdown that followed the protests against the disputed 2009 presidential election.

He was held in Tehran’s Evin prison for 191 days — three months in solitary confinement — before being released on bail in March 2010.

The charges against Maleki include “enmity with God” — which carries a possible death sentence — deriving from his alleged connections to the exiled opposition group the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MKO); insulting the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and acting against national security.

Maleki said he denied all the charges brought against him. He said he has never had any organizational ties whatsoever with the MKO or any other groups or parties.

Regarding the second charge, Maleki said he told the court he had not “insulted” but “criticized” the authorities, which he considered his duty. “As for the ‘acting against national security’ charge, I just laughed,” Maleki said.

Maleki was the first chancellor of Tehran University after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. He suffers from prostate cancer and heart disease.

 

Source

Iranian youths arrested for public water pistol fight in Tehran

crazydead
-
0
Iranian youths arrested for public water pistol fight in Tehran

 

In the 40C heat of an Iranian summer, what better way to have fun and stay cool than a water fight with friends? In the Islamic republic, however, things are a bit more complicated.

For one group of boys and girls, their game turned serious when they were arrested for taking part in a water pistol fight in a park in the capital, Tehran.

Last Friday hundreds of enthusiasts used plastic pistols and empty bottles to play in the ironically named Garden of Water and Fire for hours and, to the surprise of many, without police interference. But the event – organised on Facebook – prompted criticism from conservatives when pictures of it emerged online days later.

Iran‘s state television broadcast a programme on Wednesday showing some of the arrested participants with their backs to the camera, confessing to have played with water and using plastic pistols.

“We had been invited on internet to come and play with water,” one girl said. A boy added: “It was very intimate; it was much more intimate than it should have been.”

The head of Tehran’s morality police, Ahmad Roozbehani said: “A mixed-gender event took place on Friday … They had been asked to bring water pistol toys, which most of them had in hand … they acted against social norms.”

Speaking to the semi-official Mehr news agency, Hossein Sajedinia, the city’s police chief confirmed the arrests, blaming the participants for behaving “abnormally” and disobeying Islamic principles.

Iranian MPs also condemned the water fight, spreading the debate nationwide. Hossein Ibrahimi, a conservative MP, said such events would spread “corruption” and were “shameful”.

The Guardian has learned that some of those held have not been released, including a university student.

The arrests of the organisers and participants of the event came after conservative websites urged the regime to identify those behind the water pistol fight.

Organised on a Facebook page called “Tehran’s water pistol fight”, the event attracted more than 14,000 people and prompted pages promoting similar events in other cities such as Isfahan and Karaj.

Potking Azarmehr, a London-based Iranian blogger who has written a post in response to the arrests, said: “There are two issues here which have troubled the regime: people having fun and people organising a gathering through the social media. Both are perceived as a threat by the regime.”

Golnaz Esfandiari, who has a blog on the Radio Free Europe website, Persian Letters, writes in a recent post: “There were also gatherings for paintball, kite flying, and blowing bubbles. All the events are said to have been organised through Facebook. It’s not clear why the water fight has caused more sensitivity than the previous events.”

Officials have also recently banned swimming in the sea during the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan.

Men and women not related by blood or marriage in Iran are not allowed to touch or have relationships outside social norms. However, many youths continue to push the boundaries, despite a crackdown that has targeted prohibited certain hairstyles and clothing.

 

Source

Continued Unexplained Detention of Two Kurdish Citizens

crazydead
-
0
Continued Unexplained Detention of Two Kurdish Citizens

 

The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran – A human rights activist told the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran that more than 50 days after Kurdish citizen Madeh Alavi Jani’s arrest and detention, his charges are still unknown.  After his arrest, Alavi Jani, a teacher from Saghez, was transferred from Saghez to the Sanandaj Intelligence Office on 7 June. He was returned to Saghez on 26 July. During a telephone call to his family, Alavi Jani told them that he has not been informed of any specific charges, nor presented with any valid evidence against him.

According to this source, another Kurdish citizen, Jahangir (Soran) Kasnazani, who was on active duty for his compulsory military service, was arrested by security forces in early July.  He has not contacted his family since his arrest and there is no information about his detention location.

Both Alavi Jani and Kasnazani are graduates of Zanjan University. Judicial authorities have refrained from providing any information about these arrests and the reasons for their continued detention.

 

Source

Revolutionary Guard Set as Iran Oil Chief

crazydead
-
0
Revolutionary Guard Set as Iran Oil Chief

 

The Wall Street Journal – Iran’s lawmakers Wednesday approved a sanctioned senior official from the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as oil minister, as hardliners scored a major victory in tightening control over the country’s most strategically important sector.

Brig. Gen. Rostam Ghasemi, who had been proposed by president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was approved by 216 votes from a total of 264, according to Iran’s Parliament website.

Gen. Ghasemi, who heads Khatam al-Anbiya, the most powerful economic wing of the Revolutionary Guards, will be the first commander from the elite paramilitary force to move into a ministerial post not related to defense.

The appointment is a strategic gain for the Guards, which is responsible for safeguarding Iran’s Islamic revolution and defending its borders, and who are now likely to increase their reach in the economy.

Gen. Ghasemi’s arrival at the ministry is also likely to complicate internal relations within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, over which the Islamic Republic presides under a rotating system. A key OPEC meeting split acrimoniously in June after Iran successfully thwarted a Saudi push to hike oil output.

Gen. Ghasemi is subject to sanctions by the U.S. and European for his role in helping Iran’s nuclear program.

After Mr. Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, the Revolutionary Guards won multiple contracts in the oil and gas sector, signaling the group’s rising political and economic influence. That influence has grown as sanctions force international companies to pull out of Iran.

The parliament also approved three other ministers nominated by Ahmadinejad for sport and youth; industry, mines and trade; and cooperatives, labor and social security.

 

Source

1...579580581...704Page 580 of 704