
Iran’s new parliament, dominated by conservative elements, was recently inaugurated. a former senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and three-time loser of presidential races, was elected as the speaker.
As a sign of things to come, in his first speech, Ghalibaf attacked President Hassan Rouhani for his tendency to look outside of Iran for solutions to its problems, and for his lack of faith in the resistance economy as a better alternative. Ghalibaf also characterised talks with the United States as being harmful to Iran.
It is hard to assess whether these statements reflect the new parliament’s real intentions, or whether they are merely the opening salvo for next year’s presidential election.
Regardless, Ghalibaf’s remarks reflect a shift in Iranian politics and discourse in a hardline direction, suggesting that Iran’s next president will likely be a conservative. Should this happen, conservatives would control all three branches of government.
It is possible that even the presidency could be eliminated, in favour of a prime minister as the chief executive.
Not being elected by popular vote, a prime minister would have less power and popular legitimacy than a president, and thus would be no rival for the supreme leader.
Without a president to blame, the real centres of power and decision-making would become answerable for their failures
Because of the skewed nature of the balance of power and authority in Iran against the president, such a change could be positive. Without a president to blame, the real centres of power and decision-making would become answerable for their failures, and the lines of authority and responsibility would become clearer.
Yet, changing from a presidential to a parliamentary system, and having conservatives in control of all branches of government, would not resolve Iran’s problems and challenges. Their roots lie elsewhere, including the lack of a national outlook among Iran’s leadership, the disorganised conditions of its administrative and economic structures, and the existence of parallel institutions with competing goals and interests.
Diverging interests
Paramount among the parallel institutions is the IRGC and its economic arms, with diverging domestic and foreign policy priorities.
Next in the IRGC’s order of priorities is to retain and expand its control over the country’s economy, and to enrich itself and its clerical and secular allies. It actively competes with governments in power. During the worst of the coronavirus crisis, the IRGC tried to show how it was more efficient than the government in helping people, while the government was blamed for all shortcomings.
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