When Ali Khamenei was appointed Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, knowing that he lacked the charisma of his predecessor, Ruhollah Khomeini, and therefore would need the power of the military to subdue his rivals and consolidate his position, he tried to pull the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps closer to himself. At the same time, the newly elected president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who as the wartime supreme commander had already nurtured close relations with the IRGC generals in a bid to exploit the public resources of the nation with less restrictions, sought to partner with the IRGC in his “privatization” movement—basically, the mass transfer of public property, resources and organizations from the government sector to the regime insiders. Thus, the Khatam al-Anbiya construction camp was born as the first and foremost financial institution of the IRGC.
In December 1989, Khamenei issued a decree to establish the Khatam al-Anbiya camp with the purported aim of “utilizing the civilian capacity of the armed forces to develop the construction of the country.” The camp was originally intended to be formed and run as a joint enterprise between all the branches of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic, including the army, the IRGC and the police. However, in the course of time, Khatam al-Anbiya turned into an exclusively IRGC venture with managers and senior officials appointed by the guards.
The sole body overseeing the activities of Khatam al-Anbiya is the IRGC Intelligence Protection Unit; other regulatory bodies are not mandated to monitor and request performance reports from the camp. The nominal commander of Khatam al-Anbiya is the commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards, but he appoints a successor to take over the real workings. The scope and direction of the camp’s participation in financial and economic projects is determined by the IRGC commander-in-chief.
Read the complete article at: JNS