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Maryam Shafi Pour, the student activist is arrested

shafi-pourIran Briefing – Maryam Shafi Pour, the student activist of Qazvin international university who had been prohibited from studying, has been arrested on Saturday July 27.

According to a report by Advar News, the intelligence agents had gone to her house and taken some of her personal properties including her laptop, 2 mobile phones and her personal notes 2 weeks ago.

Then they summoned her for “some explanations”, for which she went to the branch 2 of Evin Shahid Moghaddas court on Saturday. After the interrogations the agents arrested her and transferred her to Evin prison.

She had been sentenced to 1 year of suspended prison by Qazvin revolutionary court in 2010.

6 Iranian Revolution Guards killed

 

Within the context self-defence the Kurdish guerrillas of Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) are confronting the Iranian Revolution Guards Corps.IRRGC

According to latest information we have received 6 Iranian Revolution Guards were killed

The Press and Publication Centre of PJAK stated that Kurdish guerrillas attacked an Iranian army unit in the border region of Deshta Wezne.

At least six Iranian Revolution Guards were killed and several wounded.

PJAK stated that their guerrillas had no casualty and left the scene intact.

Iranian Revolution Guard Corps invaded South Kurdistan on 16th July and have kept attacking it since. They have been confronted with the Kurdish guerrillas of PJAK and received a fatal blow.

Today PJAK declared that 255 Revolution Guards have been killed.

 

A Azerbaijani musician has been sentenced to 6 months in prison

damirchi

Iran Briefing- Maestro Hassan Damirchi (Mohammad Hassan Har Goli) has been sentenced to 6 months in prison by the revolutionary court of Tabriz.

According to a report by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), the third branch of the revolutionary court of Tabriz has sentenced maestro Hassan Damirchi (Mohammad Hassan Har Goli) to 6 months in prison.

Naghi Mahmoudi, the human rights activists said to HRANA: “Judge Hamid Bagherpour has issued this verdict on the basis of proofs like participating in ethnic gatherings in and outside Iran, gathering donations without legal permission, teaching music without permission, communication with separatists in and outside Iran and visiting ethnic prisoners with the aim of appreciating them for their separatist thoughts.”

“None of the evidences the judge mentions in the verdict is a reason for the charge of propaganda against the regime which is stated in article 500 of Islamic punishment laws.” He said.

Hassan Damirchi had been arrested on the same charges several times before.

He had been sentenced to 1 year in prison during the demonstrations in Tabriz in 2006 which were against the insulting cartoon of “Iran” newspaper.

New Report on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

 

My thanks to the Gouda Kid for brining this newly released report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to my attention.avatar_caf85305aa8f_96

Here is the executive summary of the AEI report:

The election of Hassan Rouhani as president has reignited intense debate both inside and outside of Iran about the future of the Islamic Republic. Most in the West expected a hardline candidate favored by the Supreme Leader or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to win and the status quo to remain unchallenged. The unexpected turn of events suggests that there are still forces in Iran that wish to make meaningful reforms within the context of the current system. But even if Rouhani indeed desires to make reforms, can his government make substantive changes on issues that most concern the U.S., such as Iran’s nuclear program and support for Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria?

Answering this question depends largely on how the regime’s other powerful stakeholders react to the new government, especially the IRGC – the single-most powerful organization in Iran whose leaders are positioned to directly influence regime decision-making. Fully understanding the dynamics between the IRGC and other regime forces, however, requires a deeper familiarity with the human networks that make up the IRGC’s senior leadership.

This report examines the formal structures that comprise the IRGC’s senior leadership and the informal influence networks that dominate it. The central focus is a faction within the IRGC referred to here as the “Command Network” (IRGC-CN), and its extended branches.

The IRGC-CN is a group of ten commanders with deep ties dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. Its members include the IRGC and Quds Force commanders, as well as key operations and intelligence officials in the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the body charged with overseeing the military affairs of both the IRGC and Iran’s conventional force (Artesh).

Members of the IRGC-CN’s extended networks also occupy influential positions in the IRGC and AFGS, such as commander of the IRGC’s Greater Tehran unit and head of the AFGS Operations Directorate. Members also extend into the political realm, and include the mayor of Tehran, a deputy of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, and the governor of Zanjan province.

The IRGC-CN has endured through conflicts and crises since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, including the 1999 Tehran University clashes, 2009 post-election protest movement, and changes in organizational command in 1997 and 2007. Where one would expect significant purging of or divisions in the IRGC’s leadership following these events, we saw the opposite: IRGC-CN members retained and expanded their control over the IRGC’s key command and staff positions.

The IRGC-CN will be a dominant voice in the regime for the foreseeable future. Based on its demonstrated ability to remain cohesive through periods of instability, the Command Network will likely continue to retain formal control of the Guards in the face of internal and external pressures. The IRGC-CN has also begun to selectively recruit the next generation of commanders to fill key positions as senior leaders slowly retire or transition into politics, ensuring that this network’s interests are safeguarded.

If President-elect Rouhani desires to make fundamental changes to the Islamic Republic’s core national security policies, he will need to win the support of the IRGC-CN or subvert it. Either scenario presents Rouhani with considerable challenges, as this network has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and has previously shown a willingness to act aggressively to protect its interests.

If you wish to read the full report, click here.

Matthevaid

Iranian Guards Say Its Biggest Issue Is Poor Communication

 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the elite military corps feared for its crackdowns on internal dissent and pervasive presence in Iranian society, says it hasn’t been a good

IRGC: Rape, Sex, Drug, Terrorism, and Moral Decay
IRGC: Rape, Sex, Drug, Terrorism, and Moral Decay

communicator.

Its spokesman, in rare comments about the Guards’ work published today in the Shargh newspaper, wants it to do a better job trumpeting its achievements.

“I see the most important weakness of the Guards as being in the information arena,” Ramezan Sharif told the Tehran-based newspaper. “Despite much effort, we haven’t been able to present correctly the work and actions of this popular and revolutionary entity.”

Sharif said the Guards, apart from keeping foreign aggressors at bay, has been a key driver of the country’s economy, pressing ahead on infrastructure and energy projects even after international sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program restricted foreign investment and operations.

“Despite certain political propaganda, it isn’t the Guards that is seeking to take on projects, it’s been governments that have tried to make better use of its potential,” Sharif said.

The unusual glimpse into the Guards came less than two weeks before Hassan Rohani is scheduled to replace President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who promoted the Guards’ influence during his eight-year tenure.

Iran’s clerical rulers created the Guards after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the monarchy to safeguard the Islamic Republic’s core principles. Over time, it became an increasingly powerful force in Iran’s economy and political life, with many top officials in Ahmadinejad’s government having been members.

The Guards and its militia, the Basij, played a key role in suppressing mass protests that broke out over after the disputed 2009 presidential election. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneiand the Guards said protesters played into the hands of Western powers plotting to topple the Islamic Republic regime.

To contact the reporter on this story: Ladane Nasseri in Dubai at [email protected]

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Andrew J. Barden at [email protected]

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

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Compiled by Holly Dagres

1905: Constitutional Revolution begins amid struggle for independence from Russian and British control; the first parliament is formed in 1906 under the new constitution, which limits power of the Qajar monarchy.

1907:
 Anglo-Russian Entente divides Persia into three spheres: British, Russian and neutral.

1908: 
British geologists discover oil in the neutral sphere of Persia; Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) is formed.

1926: 
Cossack Brigade officer Reza Khan (1878–1944) overthrows the Qajar Dynasty and is crowned Shah of Persia.

1935:
 Reza Shah asks foreign delegations to refer to the country as Iran, a name dating from ancient times, rather than Persia.

1941: 
Concerned about Iran’s pro-German leanings in World War II, Britain and the Soviet Union occupy Iran and replace Reza Shah with his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980).

1951:
 Mohammad Mossadegh (1882–1967) is elected prime minister; he nationalizes the British-controlled Iranian oil industry and curbs powers of shah.

1953: 
Mossadegh is overthrown in a coup d’état backed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the British intelligence agency MI6.

1957:
 Shah and President Dwight Eisenhower sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program; the Central Treaty Organization’s Institute of Nuclear Science moves headquarters from Baghdad to Tehran.

1959:
 Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) is established at Tehran University.

1963: 
Shah initiates the White Revolution, a modernization program for economic, social, and political reform; riots follow arrest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) for anti-shah speech.

1964:
 Khomeini begins fourteen years in exile in Najaf and Paris.

1967:
 Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) begins operation at TNRC.

1968:
 Iran signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the opening day for signatures; it is ratified by parliament in 1970.

1972:
 Iran signs the Biological Weapons Convention; it is ratified by parliament in 1973.

1974:
 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is established, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center is set up to develop nuclear technology; Iran signs a $1.2 billion deal with the France-based Eurodif consortium to enrich uranium on French soil and supply fuel to the TRR and future nuclear power facilities; Iran signs agreements with West German and French companies to build reactors in Bushehr and Bandar Abbas; Iran concludes NPT Safeguards Agreement, enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to independently verify the accuracy of Iran’s declarations about its nuclear material and activities.

1975:
 Shah states that Iran has “no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them, Iran might have to reconsider its policy”; Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signs U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation memorandum endorsing $6.4 billion deal for six to eight nuclear reactors.

1978: 
At a New Year’s Eve state dinner in Tehran, President Jimmy Carter toasts shah as “island of stability in a turbulent corner of the world”; in January, seminary students in holy city of Qom demonstrate after an article in leading state newspaper Ettelaat ridicules Khomeini; police kill several protestors; ranking cleric declares shah’s regime “un-Islamic”; incident triggers year-long cycle of religious demonstrations; in September, police kill hundreds of demonstrators in Jaleh Square massacre in Tehran; in October, public sector strikes paralyze economy.

January 16, 1979: 
Shah flees Iran; mass demonstrations demand resignation of government of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (1914–1991).

February 1, 1979:
 Khomeini returns to Iran as leader of Iran’s revolution.

February 11, 1979:
 Khomeini names Mehdi Bazargan (1907–1995) of Iran Freedom Movement as prime minister; Bakhtiar government collapses.

March 30, 1979:
 Iranians abolish monarchy and approve Islamic republic in referendum.

November 4, 1979
 Iranian protestors seize the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and hold fifty-two Americans as hostages for 444 days.

November 12, 1979:
 U.S. Proclamation 4702 imposes an Iranian oil import ban.

November 14, 1979:
 U.S. Executive Order 12170 freezes $12 billion in Iranian assets held in the United States.

1980:
  U.S. Executive Order 12205 prohibits U.S. commercial trade with Iran, with the exception of clothing donations, food, and medical supplies; U.S. Executive Order 12211 prohibits the import of Iranian goods or services and financial transactions with Iran; Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, with support from Western nations, launches an invasion of Iran, marking the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War.

1981:
 U.S. and Iran sign the Algiers Accords, under which U.S. unfreezes Iranian assets, revokes previous executive orders, and commits not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs, upon the release of U.S. hostages; AEOI announces discovery of four uranium deposits in Iran.

1982:
 Iran establishes Hizbollah organization in Lebanon amid Israel’s invasion of Lebanon; group leads resistance to the ensuing eighteen-year Israeli occupation.

1983:
 Iran asks IAEA to provide technical assistance with the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a gas compound used for uranium enrichment.

1984:
 Iraqi forces bomb the Bushehr site; China assists Iran in establishing a nuclear research center in Esfahan; State Department designates Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism; U.S. enforces sanctions on Iran including: restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, limits on exports of dual-use items, and miscellaneous financial restrictions.

1986: 
Revelations emerge in Iran-Contra Affair that the President Ronald Reagan administration secretly provided weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of Americans held hostage by pro-Iranian factions in Lebanon.

1987:
 U.S. Executive Order 12613 prohibits the import of Iranian products and oil into the United States; Iran signs a $5.5 million deal with Argentina to supply a new TRR core.

1988: 
Guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes shoots down Iran Air Flight 655 in the Strait of Hormuz, killing 290 passengers and crew; U.S. says that American forces mistakenly identified the civilian Airbus A300 as a hostile military aircraft, and provides restitution to the families of the victims; Iran accepts UN Resolution 598, calling for a cease-fire with Iraq, effectively ending the war; estimates of Iranians killed, including victims of Iraqi chemical weapon attacks, range from 180,000 to 300,000.

1989:
 Khomeini dies; former President Ali Khamenei (1939–) becomes supreme leader; Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–) is elected president.

1990:
 Iran signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with China.

1992: 
Iran and Russia sign an agreement on the sale of heavy-water reactors to Iran; U.S. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act imposes sanctions on foreign entities that provide Iran technology that could be used in the development of WMDs.

1993:
 Iran signs the Chemical Weapons Convention; it is ratified by parliament in 1997.

1995: 
Iran signs $800 million deal with Russia to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant; U.S. Executive Order 12957 prohibits transactions related to the development of Iran’s oil industry; U.S. Executive Order 12959 prohibits re-exportation of goods or technology to, and investments in, Iran.

1996: 
U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)—later known as Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)— imposes sanctions on foreign entities that invest in Iran’s energy sector.

1997: 
Reformist cleric Mohammed Khatami (1943–) is elected president; U.S. Executive Order 13059 clarifies Executive Orders 12957 and 12959 confirming that virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited.

1998:
 Khatami proposes a “dialogue among civilizations” in hopes of easing U.S.-Iranian tensions.

1999:
 Iran and Saudi Arabia support a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East.

2000: 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright says Washington bears some responsibility for turbulent U.S.-Iranian relations, citing support for shah’s repressive regime, backing for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, and role in the 1953 coup; U.S. lifts sanctions on non-oil products including carpets, pistachios, and caviar; U.S. Iran Nonproliferation Act sanctions foreign entities assisting Iran’s development of WMDs; reformists win a majority of seats in parliamentary elections.

2001: 
Al-Qaeda attacks World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington, DC, killing 3,000; United States leads invasion of Afghanistan; President George W. Bush says aim is “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime”; U.S. Executive Order 13224 blocks assets of entities or individuals supporting terrorism.

2002
: Bush accuses Iran, Iraq, and North Korea of pursuing weapons of mass destruction and labels the regimes an “axis of evil”; Mujahedeen Khalq opposition group reveals that Iran is secretly building two nuclear sites: a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, and a heavy-water nuclear plant in Arak.

February 2003:
 Iran acknowledges Natanz and other facilities, and announces that it has extracted uranium from a newly discovered mine in Savand; Iran accepts modifications in NPT Subsidiary Arrangements, requiring Iran to notify IAEA of intentions to set up nuclear facilities; it is not ratified by parliament.

March 2003:
 United States leads invasion of Iraq; Bush says aims are “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”

May 2003:
 Swiss Ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann delivers an Iranian offer to the United States, said to be backed by Khamenei and Khatami, proposing negotiations on a broad range of issues including nuclear safeguards, economic cooperation, coordination in Iraq, support for an Arab plan for peace with Israel, and halting weapons supplies to Palestinian groups; Bush administration ignores the proposal.

September 2003: 
Khatami says in a speech: “We don’t need atomic bombs, and based on our religious teaching, we will not pursue them. But at the same time, we want to be strong, and being strong means having knowledge and technology.”

October 2003:
 Iranian lawyer Shirin Ebadi (1947–) is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for her efforts for democracy and human rights”; Iran begins negotiations over its nuclear program with Britain, France, and Germany (EU3); in the Sa’dabad Declaration, Khatami agrees to suspend all enrichment activities, allow snap inspections by the IAEA, and sign the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement.

November 2003: 
Iran announces temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program.

December 2003: 
Iran signs the Additional Protocol; it is not ratified by parliament.

2004:  
Iran acknowledges covert program to acquire nuclear technology; announces plan to build a heavy-water nuclear reactor; Iran reveals production of hexafluoride gas used to enrich uranium, ignoring the IAEA’s demand for suspension of all enrichment activities; Iran and EU3 sign Paris Agreement, under which EU3 and Iran will negotiate on guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and on commitments on nuclear, technology, and economic cooperation.

February 2005:
 Iranian Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani says in an interview with Iranian newspaper Sharq that acquiring a nuclear weapon is not in Iran’s national interest; Iran and Russia sign an agreement for Russia to supply the Bushehr nuclear facility with fuel and Iran to return the fuel rods to ensure enriched uranium is not used for production of nuclear weapons.

June 2005: 
U.S. Executive Order 13382 freezes assets of entities that support proliferators of WMDs; hardliner and former Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (1956–) is elected president.

August 2005:
 Khamenei issues a religious ruling (fatwa) forbidding the “production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons”; at United Nations, Ahmadinejad calls denial of Iran’s nuclear rights “nuclear apartheid”; Bush threatens Iran with military force over its nuclear program, saying “all options are on the table.”

October 2005:
 International controversy erupts over Ahmadinejad’s reported comment at a “World Without Zionism” conference in Tehran that Israel should be “wiped off the map.”

January 2006:
 Iran announces that it has achieved the capacity to extract uranium from ore; Iran breaks IAEA seals at the Natanz facility.

February 2006: 
IAEA refers Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for noncompliance of the Safeguards Agreement after reporting inconclusive findings about Iran’s nuclear program.

April 2006:
 IAEA report says that Iran produced 3.6 percent enriched uranium but found no sign that Iran enriched uranium for military purposes.

May 2006:
 United States, Britain, and France draft a UN resolution that would force Iran to halt uranium enrichment activities, or face penalties and potential military action; China and Russia reject the resolution.

June 2006:
 P5+1 negotiating group is formed, consisting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, Britain, France, Russia and China) and Germany; it offers Iran economic, political, and technological incentives if it addresses all IAEA concerns regarding its nuclear program.

July 2006: 
UNSC Resolution 1696 demands that Iran halt uranium enrichment activities within a month.

August 2006:
 Ahmadinejad inaugurates heavy-water nuclear plant in Arak; Iran rejects P5+1 proposals, citing condition that it suspend uranium enrichment.

September 2006: 
U.S. Iran Freedom Support Act appropriates $10 million to aid groups opposed to the Iranian government.

December 2006:
 UNSC Resolution 1737 is adopted after Iran fails to comply with Resolution 1696; It freezes assets of entities supporting Iran’s nuclear program, and bans export of nuclear-related materials and technology to Iran.

January 2007: 
Iranian state media reports that nuclear scientist Ardeshir Hosseinpour died of asphyxiation due to a gas leak in his apartment.

March 2007: 
UNSC Resolution 1747 expands the freeze on Iranian assets, bans arms sales to Iran, and asks global financial institutions not to enter commitments with the Iranian government.

April 2007:
 Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has achieved the capacity to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale; Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani says Iran has injected gas into 3,000 centrifuges.

August 2007:
 Iran and IAEA reach agreement for a work plan that specifies processes and a timeline to resolve outstanding issues regarding Iran’s Safeguards Agreement

November 2007:
 IAEA report states that Iran has “provided sufficient access to individuals and responded in a timely manner to questions” regarding its nuclear program; IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calls on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities and fully implement the Additional Protocol; Iran acknowledges that it acquired nuclear technology, including P-2 centrifuge blueprints, from A.Q. Khan network over the past two decades; U.S. National Intelligence Estimate states “We judge with high confidence that in Fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”

February 2008:
 IAEA report says Iran failed to disclose efforts to link uranium processing and explosives and to design missile warheads.

March 2008:
 UNSC Resolution 1803 demands that Iran halt uranium enrichment and heavy water-related activities, and urges states to limit financial transactions with Iran and cut ties with two Iranian banks.

June 2008:
 P5+1 announces a repackaged proposal based on the June 2006 offer.

July 2008:
 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns participates in talks with Iranian negotiators in Geneva.

September 2008:
 UNSC Resolution 1835 reaffirms four previous UNSC resolutions on Iran.

March 2009: 
President Barack Obama, in a Nowruz message to Iran’s “people and leaders,” calls for an end to “old divisions”; Obama says: “The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations.”

June 2009: 
Ahmadinejad is declared the winner in presidential election; reformist opponent Mir-Hossein Moussavi alleges election fraud; hundreds of thousands of “Green Movement” supporters hold demonstrations; months of disturbances result in an estimated seventy months deaths.

September 2009:
 Iran acknowledges to the IAEA the existence of the Fordo uranium enrichment facility near Qom.

October 2009:
 P5+1 announces the TRR fuel swap proposal, for low-enriched uranium to be shipped from Iran to Russia and then to France for further enrichment; fuel rods would be then sent to Iran for production of isotopes for medical use; Iran rejects fuel swap proposal.

November 2009:
 IAEA condemns Iran for developing the secret uraniaum enrichment site near Qom; Iran announces plans to establish ten additional enrichment sites.

January 2010:
 Iranian state media reports that a remote-controlled bomb explosion killed Masoud Ali-Mohammadi, a physics professor at Tehran University reportedly tied to Iran’s nuclear program.

February 2010: 
Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has produced 20 percent enriched uranium.

May 2010: Iran signs Tehran Declaration agreement with Turkey and Brazil calling for a TRR fuel swap; United States, Russia, and France reject agreement; U.S. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) expands previous American punitive measures against foreign entities that invest in Iran’s oil industry, and sanctions human rights violators in Iran.

June 2010:
 UNSC Resolution 1929 demands that Iran comply with previous UNSC resolutions, and expands financial, military, and travel sanctions on Iran; security researchers identify Stuxnet 0.5 computer virus attacking Iranian targets.

August 2010:
 Iran holds ceremony marking the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant; in 2011, officials announce that the plant has been connected to Iran’s national energy grid; EU bans trade related to Iranian natural gas production.

November 2010:
 Ahmadinejad announces that a cyber attack damaged centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear facility; experts believe that a Stuxnet attack struck Natanz; Iranian state media reports that separate bomb blasts in Tehran killed nuclear engineer Majid Shahriyari and injured nuclear scientist Fereydoun Abbasi-Dabani.

July 2011:
 Ahmadinejad welcomes a “road map” proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that calls for eventual suspension of UN sanctions and limited enrichment activity in Iran; Iranian media report that gunmen assassinated nuclear scientist Dariush Rezaeinejad; Der Speigel reports that Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency, is behind the killing.

November 2011:
 Fars News Agency reports that a bomb explosion at an arms depot near Tehran killed seventeen members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, including Major General Hassan Moqqadam, a key figure in Iran’s ballistic missile program; U.S. Executive Order 13590 imposes sanctions on entities supporting the development of Iran’s energy industry.

January 2012:
  EU imposes an embargo on Iranian oil imports and freezes Iran’s central bank assets; Iranian media reports that an explosion in Tehran killed nuclear scientist Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan.

February 2012:
 Iran announces installation of Iranian-made nuclear fuel rods at TRR; NBC News, citing two anonymous senior U.S. officials, reports that Mossad is working with the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists; U.S. Executive Order 13599 imposes sanctions on Iran’s financial institutions and certain individuals, as well as on property and interests held by the Iranian government.

March 2012:
 SWIFT international banking network bars electronic transactions by Iranian banks.

April 2012: 
U.S. Executive Order 13606 blocks property and entry into the United States of Iranians involved in human rights abuses by means of information and communications technology.

May 2012: 
U.S. Executive Order 13608 bans certain transactions with—and bars entry into the U.S. to—those who evade or violate U.S. sanctions on Iran or Syria; IAEA reports traces of 27 percent enriched uranium at the Fordo facility.

June 2012:
 New York Times reports that the Bush administration developed a covert program, Operation Olympic Games, aimed at sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program through cyber attacks; the paper says the Obama administration continued the program.

July 2012:
 U.S. Executive Order 13622 imposes new sanctions on Iranian energy and petrochemical sectors.

August 2012:
 U.S. Iran Threat Reduction & Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA) broadens sanctions on foreign entities doing business with Iran’s energy, financial, and transportation sectors.

September 2012:
 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium could put it within reach of a nuclear weapon by mid-2013; hints at military attack if Iran fails to heed “red line.”

October 2012
: U.S. Executive Order 13628 authorizes implementation of ITRSHRA, including sanctions on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.

January 2013:
 Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak says “if worse comes to worst, there should be a readiness and an ability to launch a surgical operation that will delay [Iran’s nuclear weapons program] by a significant time frame.”

February 2013:
 Vice President Joe Biden offers direct talks on Iran’s nuclear program; Khamenei rejects the offer saying sanctions on Iran are a “gun held to its head.”

March 2013: 
Asked on Israeli television if the U.S. would attack Iran if diplomacy failed, Obama said “All options are on the table. The United States obviously has significant capabilities.”

April 2013: 
Iran announces it has activated a uranium processing plant and two uranium mines to expand Iran’s capacity to produce nuclear material.

May 2013: 
IAEA report finds that Iran has produced 324 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium; U.S. ends ban on sale of communications equipment and software to Iranians.

June 2013: 
Cleric Hassan Rowhani (1948–), former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and lead nuclear negotiator, is elected president; U.S. Executive Order 13645 imposes sanctions on Iran’s automobile industry and on transactions in Iranian currency.

Cairo Review

Rouhani meets Revolutionary Guard leadership

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London, Asharq Al-Awsat—Iranian president-elect Hassan Rouhani met with with veteran commanders of the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on Wednesday, and outlined his plans for Iranian foreign policy.1372515600697198200-e1372608992976

“The election had a message reflecting the intention of Iranian people to pursue a pro-active and dynamic foreign policy through which mutual rights and interests will be achieved,” Rouhani said.

With two weeks to go before assuming office, Rouhani is pushing hard to strengthen relations between himself and the powerful conservative hierarchy of the IRGC, a bulwark of the Islamic Republic’s political system.

Ensuring that the military and security establishment remains onside is seen by many observers as vital for Rouhani, given the fate of the reformist president Mohammad Khatami in the late 1990s and early 2000s, who faced obstruction and opposition from within the security establishment which undermined his presidency.

Rouhani, a senior cleric, trod a fine line during his address, aiming to reconcile his agenda for a more open, liberal approach, the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, and the sacrifices that the IRGC have made to defend and protect it.

Rouhani told the IRGC leadership: “No Iranian will accept damaging his country’s rights, interest, and security.” Given Rouhani’s long-standing position at the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s president-elect enjoys strong relations with the IRGC.

“We can have a logical interaction with the international community on a constant and step by step progress,” Rouhani emphasized.

Rouhani also alluded to the hard-line attitude adopted by some figures that do not support his conciliatory approach.

In an implicit reference to the isolation and suppression of reformist leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, Rouhani called for Iran’s hard-line elements to exhibit greater tolerance and broadmindedness.

Rouhani stressed that raising questions about people’s faith and extending accusations are harmful and have no place in Iranian politics.

“Our religion Islam says that once one someone says ‘I testify that Allah is the only God and I testify that Mohammad is Allah’s messenger,’ we must accept this and have no right to shed doubt on it,” he added.

Present in the meeting between Rouhani and the IRGC leadership were Mohsen Rezaei, the IRGC’s former commander, former presidential candidate, and current secretary of Expediency Council. In addition to this, current Oil Minister Rostam Qasemi and Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the former defense minister in Mohammad Khatami’s administration, were also present.

Observers speculated that the purpose of the meeting was to bolster the existing ties between Rouhani and influential IRGC generals for a smooth transfer of of power next month, when Rouhani is due to be sworn in as president.

Outgoing Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad enjoyed a close relationship with the IRGC during his first term, though ties became frayed during his final term in office.

In particular, Ahmadinejad’s reputation suffered substantially due to his strong support for his favorite aide Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, as well his reluctance to conform with Iran’s traditional conservative faction.

Meanwhile, Rasoul Montajab Nia, a pro-reform member of National Trust Party, has said that serious efforts are underway to secure the release of Mehdi Karroubi— a founding member and secretary general of National Trust Party—from house arrest, according to the Tehran Press website.

“Once these efforts come to fruition the National Trust Party will resume its activities calling its central committee,” Montajan Nia was quoted as saying.

Stepping down, Ahmadinejad’s future remains a mystery

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TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Mock condolences arriving by text message in Iran announce the political “death” of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Memorial services, the joke Ahmadinejad_Mashayiecontinues, are planned at the United Nations in tribute to his swaggering style each year in New York.

The satire may bring smirks from the many foes Ahmadinejad has racked up over eight years in office, stemming from several high-profile feuds with the ruling clerics and one disputed re-election. But no one is truly counting Ahmadinejad out of Iran’s political future, which could face some bumpy times as he decides his next moves and his opponents plot possible payback.

One way or another, the combative and polarizing aura of the soon-to-be former president is not going to dissipate once his centrist successor, Hasan Rouhani, is sworn in Aug. 4.

Ahmadinejad has remained evasive on his post-presidential plans. Speculation, however, is fanning out in several directions, including media boss and freelance statesman. A trip to Iraq this week — one of his last major moments in the spotlight as president — will be watched closely for clues on his next moves.

“The only thing that’s certain at this point is that Ahmadinejad and his team are just not going to pack up and go away,” said Rasool Nafisi, an Iranian affairs analyst at Strayer University in Virginia. “Iran’s political system has to be prepared for that.”

This is what makes Ahmadinejad’s departure such a potential shock to Iran’s system.

Since turbulent shakeouts immediately after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s other former presidents have remained rooted in the system. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who left the presidency in 1989, rose to become supreme leader. His successor, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, took posts within the ruling clerics. Even reformist Mohammad Khatami was careful not to fight back too hard over sweeping crackdowns on the opposition and some of the freedoms he helped engineer.

But Ahmadinejad is the kind of high-profile figure Iran has rarely seen before: He has essentially become a political orphan.

The ruling establishment holds a powerful grudge over his maverick-style challenges to Khamenei’s authority to set policies and pick key Cabinet posts, which left Ahmadinejad severely weakened in recent years. Liberals long ago rejected Ahmadinejad’s firebrand ways, which included anti-Israeli diatribes and questions over the Holocaust that also hammered his image in the West. And many former conservative backers drifted away when it became a loyalty test or either Ahmadinejad or the supreme leader.

This leaves Ahmadinejad with a small cadre of allies and pockets of supporters around the country — mainly poor and rural Iranians grateful for his government’s monthly handouts.

How he may leverage this remaining clout “is very difficult to predict,” said Ali Bigdeli, a professor in international relations in Tehran’s Beheshti University.

One intriguing hint was given last week by his closest aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who said it was “likely” Ahmadinejad could launch a media outlet.

“We are not considering formation of a political party,” said Mashaei, who was barred by the ruling clerics from the ballot in June’s election as part of the high-level fallout against Ahmadinejad. “But the media can be effective. The society needs media.”

He gave no other clues, but any media venture would certainly meet stiff resistance from the ruling theocracy and the powerful Revolutionary Guard, which hold influence over a host of news services, TV stations and newspapers.

“Ahmadinejad is very interested remaining in the media spotlight,” said Hamid Reza Shokouhi, editor of the pro-reform Mardomsalari daily. “He will use it as a tool to return him or any close ally to power.”

Some pro-Ahmadinejad sources also have floated the idea he would establish an aid-giving foundation known as “Bahar,” or “Spring,” as a way to maintain his populist image and keep alive options for a comeback bid in 2017. Iran’s presidents must leave office after two consecutive terms, but it’s possible to return after a political hiatus — as Rafsanjani tried in 2005 in his surprise loss to Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, has not slowed down even as Rouhani prepares to take over. He has kept up a steady pace of speeches, ribbon-cuttings and trips. It suggests he wants to keep his statesman image sharp for possible independent outreach and attempts at keeping a voice in Iranian affairs.

On Thursday, Ahmadinejad plans to begin a two-day trip to neighboring Iraq, where Shiite power Iran carries important influence with the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He also is scheduled to visit the Shiite religious center of Najaf, an important power base and source of potential funds for Ahmadinejad.

Yet other challenges await Ahmadinejad once he leaves office.

In early June, a criminal court summoned Ahmadinejad over a lawsuit filed by the country’s parliament speaker and a parliamentary committee. There have been no further details, but Ahmadinejad and the speaker, Ali Larijani, have waged political feuds for years. In February, Ahmadinejad released a barely audible video that purported to show discussion over bribes that included Larijani’s brother.

Behrouz Shojaei, a columnist in several pro-reform newspapers, believes more legal salvos over his presidency may come as “indirect punishment” for battling the supreme leader.

“However much Ahmadinejad may resist, though, there is the reality that he will no longer be president and the world’s attention will shift to his successor,” said the professor, Nafisi. “It began happening the moment Rouhani was elected.”

When Ahmadinejad returned earlier this month from a trip to Moscow, only a small group of supporters came to Tehran’s airport to welcome him. In the past, hundreds of people often crowded similar arrivals home.

Meanwhile, Rouhani has been embraced by Iran’s fast-moving street culture in ways never open to Ahmadinejad.

The phrase “Rouhani, mochakerim,” or “Thank you, Rouhani,” has become a catchall term for hope, achievements and complaints about Iran’s sanctions-shattered economy. It’s also a backhanded way for Ahmadinejad’s opponents to bid him goodbye.

The quip first surfaced just days after the June 14 election when Iran’s soccer team qualified for the 2014 World Cup after beating South Korea. It then went viral on Farsi websites.

This month, a hip-hop audio clip carried the refrain “Rouhani, mochakerim.” The Tehran weekly, Hamshahri Javan, printed many of the Internet messages in graffiti style on its front page. One pointed out the major economic challenges ahead: “Inflation declined to zero, Rouhani, mochakerim.” On Sunday, Iran’s Central Bank put the inflation rate at nearly 36 percent.

Later, one blog post tried to put some perspective on the transition from Ahmadinejad to Rouhani.

“We ask Rouhani to explain to the people that he is a president,” it said, “not Harry Potter.”

Copyright 2013 The Associated Press.

Iran dissidents claim new secret nuclear site uncovered

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An Iranian dissident group claims it has discovered a newly completed secret underground nuclear site some 60 kilometers northeast of Tehran.Mideast-Iran-Nuclear_Horo-635x357

“The site consists of four tunnels and has been constructed by a group of engineering and construction companies associated with the engineering arms of the Ministry of Defense and the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps],” the National Council of Resistance of Iran said in a statement released to Reuters.

It was unclear what specific nuclear work is carried out at the site, and satellite images released by the NCRI “did not appear to constitute hard evidence to support the assertion that it was a planned nuclear facility,” according to Reuters.

But the dissident group has been right more than once, and was the source that pinpointed both the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and the heavy water facility at Arak which is nearing completion.

The new complex is reportedly located in tunnels under mountains some 10 kilometers east of Damavand, a town about 50 kilometers northeast of the capital Tehran. The site has been under construction since 2006, and was completed recently, according to NCRI.

“Two of the tunnels are about 550 meters in length, and they have a total of six giant halls,” according to NCRI’s statement.

The group is opposed to the theocratic regime that has ruled Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979, and is affiliated with an armed branch, the People’s Mujahideen Organization of Iran, which it said had obtained the information about the new site.

Iran is currently under harsh UN sanctions targeting its energy and financial sectors as the regime is believed by Israel, the US, European states and others to be pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Tehran has remained defiant, stating several times in recent years that it planned to expand its nuclear program and construct new facilities throughout the country.

TİMES OF İSRAEL

The EU Must Designate Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as Terrorists

 

Iran is one of the largest sponsors of terrorism worldwide. Many people know about Hezbollah and other Iranian backed terror groups, but ignore their controllers, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG).Khamenei-IRGC

The IRG is a branch of Iran’s government committed to protecting Iran’s Islamist revolution. They do this through brutally suppressing democracy at home and by exporting the revolution abroad, generally through terrorism. This is either through the creation of terror groups, for instance Hezbollah in the 1980s, or sending their own operatives into countries including Argentina, Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Kenya, Venezuela, and the United States. This is often done through the IRG’s external branch, the Quds Force, which has been engaged in terrorist activities as well as training and providing financial support for groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas. What’s more, the IRG is a direct threat to Europe and Israel, whom they despise for their opposition to Islamic extremism and their abhorrence of terrorism.

The EU should designate the IRG as a terrorist group. Counter-terrorist experts believe that proscribing terror groups is something that leads to the choking off of funds to these organizations, their key members and supporters, and terrorist allies. The EU already realizes this because it lists many organisations as terrorist groups, including Hamas.

The IRG, just like Hamas, aims to indiscriminately kill civilians and is a threat to European citizens. The IRG has also targeted European nations who have been present in Afghanistan as part of the NATO coalition, by providing much military equipment to the Taliban. These weapons have been used to kill Afghan civilians and many NATO servicemen. In fact, in 2011 the British Army intercepted a large catchment of arms provided by the IRG.

The IRG has also directly targeted many European nations including Britain. According to a detailed investigation by the Guardian, an operation that led to the kidnapping of five British men in Iraq in the aftermath of the Iraq war was initiated by the IRG. It is alleged that within days of being kidnapped at a Government ministry in Baghdad, the British soldiers were taken to Iran and incarcerated in a prison run by the Quds force. The IRG’s naval branch also kidnapped 15 British navy personnel on 23rd March 2007 from HMS Cornwall. They were released on 4th April 2007 but not before they were paraded on Iranian state TV and seriously mistreated.

The IRG’s reach is truly global. This is highlighted by the fact that an Indian Government investigation looking into the February 2012 bomb attack aimed at an Israeli diplomat in the Indian capital, Delhi, concluded that the main suspects were members of the IRG. Moreover, the Indian police investigation found that the IRG had also been planning violent attacks in Georgia and Thailand.

Whether the EU likes it or not, they cannot continue to pursue policies which ignore this kind of threat. The EU must designate the IRG as a terrorist organization. If they do not, all their words on standing up to terrorism are hollow.

If, like me and the UK Zionist Federation, you believe that the EU should stand up to terrorism and speak up for humanity, please sign our petition here. For further information on how you can support the campaign please visit our website or email me at [email protected]. With your support we can make sure that politicians hear our calls to list the IRG as a terrorist group.

Further information about our campaign can be found here and information about the IRG’s destabilising role in Syria can be read here.

Stephen Hoffman is a graduate of the University of Leeds where he studied Politics and Parliamentary Studies. He currently works as the Campaigns Officer for the UK Zionist Federation. He is an active member of the UK Conservative Party and tweets at @thehoff102

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